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No.83-727..:cpx
ALEXANDER

Cert to CA6 (Keith, Jones)
ritt, dissenting)

(Mer-

v.
JENNINGS, ~

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

Whether the CA6 erred in concluding that resps

had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis
of hand·icap by demonstrating

that a proposed reduction

in the

number of hospital days covered by the State's Medicaid program
(

would

have

a

more

severe

impact on handicapped

than on non-

handicapped persons.
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2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Tennessee Medicaid recipi'
ents challenged Tennessee's decision to 'reduce tha1 number of

''I

inpatient hospital days the program provides in a fiscal year to
each eligible recipient from 20 to 14.

They claimed that the

proposed reduction violated §504 of the Rehabilitation Act,

29

U.S.C. §794, and regulations promulgated thereunder, because it
had a disparate impact on handicapped individuals.
The

state conceded

that

the change would have a

greater

impact on handicapped individuals, since handicapped individuals
used inpatient hospital services more than non-handicapped individuals.

It urged, however, that that impact did not constitute

the type of "disparate impact" required to establish a violation
of §504.
The DC (Morton)

concluded that the respondents had not es-

tablished a prima facie case of a violation of §504.

It found

the statistics provided by resps insufficient to support a finding of disparate impact.

Even if the statistics were sufficient,

the DC concluded that the disparate impact they demonstrated was
not of the type proscribed by §504.

The resps' evidence demon-

strated an adverse impact on the effectiveness of those services.
Section 504, however, requires only equal access to services.
The CA6

reversed.

It found the DC's dismissal of resps'

statistics an improper confusion of a prima facie case with the
ultimate

outcome

of

the

case.

The

regulations

require

that

handicapped persons be given an equal opportunity to succeed at
the goal of the program and that the program be run in a manner
that does not impair its objectives.

r'

The objectives of the Med-

icaid program are
allotted

to provide the

funds _ can provide.

best care and treatment the

Thus,

by demonstrati11g

that the

''I

state's proposed change would disproportionately affect the ability of handicapped individuals to receive that care, resps' statistics demonstrated the kind of inequality sought to be prevented by §504.
The CA6 noted that establishing a prima facie case was only
a first

step.

It requires the state to present some evidence

that its decision is a rational one.

Here, resps had come for-

ward with an alternative method of achieving the state's desired
cost savings that would alleviate the burden on handicapped persons.

The method,

as explained by the CA6, was to limit the

total number of visits per annum, rather than the number of days
of care. 1

The CA6 held that the State should be required to

provide a substantial justification for its choice of a reduction
in inpatient hospital days when equal savings could be achieved
by limiting

the number

of admissions.

One such

justification

might be that the alternative proposal would not yield the same
amount of cost savings achieved by the State's per day reduction.
Judge Merritt dissented.
erly has

read

the statute as

equality of results.

In his view, the majority improprequiring

affirmative action or

All that §504 requires is equality of ac-

1 Resps indicate that the CA6 was confused about their proposal,
although that confusion should have no effect on this Court's
consideration of the case.
Their proposal was to limit the
number of days of hospital coverage on a per-stay basis, without
a limit on the number of stays per year.
I

'."'"

cess.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs contend first that the fA6 erred in

'I

concluding that a prima facie violation of §504 could be established by demonstrating disparate "impact" or "effects".

Even if

the CA6 was correct in that conclusion, it erred in determining
that equality of results,

not just of access,

is required by

§ 504.
Resps urge that the case is not ripe for review.
has made no finding of discrimination.
rebut

The CA6

On remand, the State may

the prima facie case established by resps'

statistics.

Resps also insist that the State has not before argued that the
"disparate impact"

standard was

inappropriate for determining

whether a prima facie violation of §504 had been established.

It

has urged only that the disparate impact which they conceded to
be present did not establish discrimination under §504.
resps urge that the CA6 was correct.

Finally,

Its decision that resps had

established a prima facie violation is consistent with the regulations promulgated under the statute and with decisions of other
circuits that have considered similar claims.
4.

DISCUSSION:

In Guardians Association v. Civil Service

Commission of New York,

103 S.Ct.

3221

(1983),

five Justices

found that a violation of Title VI could be established by demonstrating that a challenged examination had a disparate impact on
minorities.

Section 504 is modeled after Title VI.

It therefore

seems reasonable to assume that a violation of §504 also can be
established by demonstrating that a challenged practice or change
i

would have a disparate impact on handicapped persons.

.'

- ..

The proper application of the disparate impact standard to a

,

§504

violation

is

not

clear.

The

CA6

relied

§84.4(4) of the regulations to find that the
the proposed change was proscribed by §504.

pr i.ip1arily on

dispar~le

impact of

Section 84.4(4)

prohibits "criteria or methods of administration .

(i) that

have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to
discrimination on the basis of handicap,

( i i) that have the pur-

pose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program with respect to handicapped persons".

The problem with reading resps'

statistics to demonstrate discrimination on the basis of handicap
is that if the statistics are correct, any cutback on available
hospitalization would impact handicapped persons more severely
than non-handicapped persons.

And, as the Judge Merritt points

out in dissent, although it may be true that the State could have
devised a different scheme to save money that would not have had
the same disparate effect on the handicapped persons included in
resps' studies, it would seem that any reduction in funding or
services, however effected, would have a disparate effect on some
class of handicapped patients.

If the State limited the number

of trips to the hospital during the year rather than the number
of total days covered, the change would fall hardest on the class
of patients who must come to the hospital for treatment often.
It seems pointless to force the State to justify its choice of a
cost-cutting method that has a disparate impact on handicapped
persons if any of its choices necessarily would have a greater
impact on handicapped persons.

. ·- .

On the other hand, as resps point out, the CA6 has not made
a finding of discrimination.

It has held only that resps have

made out a prima facie case.

In doing so, it is coJ sistent with

other courts of appeals that have recognized that a prima facie
case could be established by demonstrating that a change in services would impose a greater burden on handicapped than on nonhandicapped persons.
1322

(CA3

1981).

(Title VI).

See NAACP v. The Medical Center, 657 F.2d

Cf.

Bryan v.

Koch,

627 F.2d 612

(CA2 1980)

None of those courts has made an ultimate finding of

discrimination on the basis of the plaintiffs' showing.

Similar-

ly, in this case, the State should have little trouble rebutting
resps'

prima facie case.

Requiring a State to do so does not

impose a heavy burden on the State; presumably it can be done on
a motion for summary judgment.
Assuming that the CA6 is correct that a prima facie case can
be established by the use of statistics indicating that a proposed

change

in Medicaid

services

impacts handicapped persons

more severely than non-handicapped persons, the decision of the
CA6

involves simply

facts of this case.

the application of

that principle

to the

Even if the CA6 is not correct, resps appear

to be correct that petrs did not challenge use of the disparate
impact test below.

There is a strong likelihood that the resps

will not prevail ultimately.

Thus,

there is little reason for

this Court to review the decision at this juncture.
5.

(

RECOMMENDATION:

There is a response.

I recommend denial.

December 12, 1983

Taylor
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LAMAR ALEXANDER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF TENNESSEE, ET AL. v. ROSIER JENNINGS ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 83-727.

Decided January-, 1984

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
The State of Tennessee, represented in this lawsuit by
petitioner, restructured _l)o.rt!Q._ns o.f...tt§.!iedicaid Plan in response to budgetary constraints. One c1iange }llade by the
state was to reduce the number of hospital days covered by
Medicaid from
to 14 in any one year. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that such an action was a
prima facie violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U. S. C. § 794, because statistical evidence introduced in the
District Court by respondents showed that a larger percentage of handicapped patients than of nonhandicapped patients
would be affected by the change in the number of hospital
days covered by the Plan.
More than one aspect of the decision of the Court of A ast term m Guardians
peals seems to me quit aebatable.
Association v. Civil Servtce ommission of New York, - U. S. - , 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), the Court attempted to
settle the question of whether a disparate adverse impact
theory is ever appropriate to establish a violation of Title VI,
42 U.S. C. §2000d, et seq., the statutory provision which
prohibits discrimination on account of race or national origin
in federally funded programs. 1 I continue to adhere to my
In Guardians Association seven members of the Court concluded that
a violation of Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent. 103
S. Ct. 3221, 3236 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined by the CHIEF JUSTICE);
id., at 3237 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring); id., at 3237-3239 (O'CONNOR, J.,
concurring); id., at 3249, 3253 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by JusTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN). Two members of the Court concluded
1

2

· ALEXANDER v. JENNINGS

view that that theory is inapplicable to cases alleging racial
and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI, and
I would also hold that it is inapplicable to cases alleging
handicap discrimination in violation of § 504, a statute which
is modeled after Title VI. SeeS. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6390-6391, reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 6373.
The operative lan age of § 504 provides that no handicapped individual sha solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance .... " 29 U. S. C.
§ 794. This doe
t seem to me to be the language of ~s
pa!ate im_pact." The Court o ppeals relied on ecisions
relating to Title VI, and to the regulations promulgated
under § 504, describing the latter as specifically forbidding
"the use of federal funds for programs which have discriminatory effects against the handicapped." 715 F. 2d 1036, 1041.
Even if I believed that those regulations, set forth in the
margin, 2 could validly proscribe conduct beyond that which
that a violation of Title VI may be established by proof of discriminatory
impact alone, i d., at 3222-3227 (WHITE, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court); i d., at 3239-3244 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), but one of those two
concluded that only noncompensatory relief could be awarded for such a
violation. !d., at 3232-3235 (WHITE, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court). Finally, three members of the Court concluded that a violation of
the regulations promulgated under Title VI may be established by proof of
discriminatory impact. !d., at 3253-3255 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting, joined
by JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN).
2
45 CFR 84.4 (1983), provides in relevant part:
§ 84.4 Discrimination prohibited.
(a) General. No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity which
receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.
(b)(4) A recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements , utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the

. ALEXANDER v. JENNINGS

3

§ 504 itself proscribes, I do not believe that they support the
result reached by the Court of Appeals in this case. I do not
believe that Tennessee's decision to reduce spending across
the board on a broadly available program of medical benefits
is impermissible under either the statute or its regulations.
It is undisputed that Tennessee proposed to reduce the
number of inpatient hospital days from 20 to 14 days per year
solely because of the state's need to implement budget cuts. 3
To establis that Tennessee s facia y neu ra proposal nonetheless would have a disparate impact on handicapped
individuals, respondents produced evidence showing that for
fiscal year 1979-1980, the percentage of handicapped recipients who would not be served by the proposed 14 days of
inpatient care was almost four times greater than the percentage of nonhandicapped recipients who would not be
served by 14 days. 518 F. Supp. 877, 880-881.
Given their special medical needs, however, it is not surprising that respondents' statistics indicate that handicapped
individuals as a class will require more hospital days than will
nonhandicapped individuals to order to maintain their health.
Yet in my view the state has no statutory obligation to
ensure that its Medicaid program is equally effective for
handicapped and nonhandicapped recipients so long as its
program is equally accessible to both groups. In analyzing
effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the
basis of handicap, (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's
program with respect to handicapped persons, or (iii) that perpetuate the
discrimination of another recipient if both recipients are subject to common
administrative control or are agencies of the same State.
a As the Sixth Circuit recognized:
"The evidence presented showed that the Medicaid program would have
required $42,000,000 additional dollars to maintain the same level of services during fiscal year 1980-81 as were provided in fiscal year 1979-80.
Since the state of Tennessee is prohibited by statute from deficit spending
in its Medicaid program, it must provide services within the means granted
by its General Assembly." 715 F. 2d 1036, 1044 (1983).

~'

'

1

4

ALEXANDER v. JENNINGS

respondents' statistics, the District Court correctly noted
that in this case the "alleged problem is not with access, but
with the end result. . . . [N]either the statute nor the accompanying regulations require a program to achieve identical results for handicapped and nonhandicapped persons."
!d., at 883. The Sixth Circuit majority rejected the District
Court's view of the Act, stating that the Act's "objective is to
afford the best cure, therapy, or preventative treatment that
the allotted funds can provide." 715 F. 2d, at 1043 n. 8.
Thus a statute designed only to assure equal access for the
handicapped to all federally funded programs has been converted by the Court of Appeals into a statute requiring the
state to take affirmative action to ensure that whatever funds
the state allots maximize the medical benefit to the
handicapped.
I believe that such an interpretation fundamentally misconstrues Congress's purpose in passing the Rehabilitation Act.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397,
410-411 (1979), we distinguished even-handed treatment of
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, action which the
Act does require, from affirmative action to accommodate the
special needs of the handicapped, action which the Act does
not require.
See also Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 27 (1981). The regulations promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act state specifically
that a federally funded program is not "required to produce
the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped
and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped
persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result." 45
CFR § 84.4(b)(2) (1983). Undoubtedly Tennessee can satisfy
that objective by providing that Medicaid will pay for the
same number of inpatient hospital days for handicapped as
for nonhandicapped individuals; in my view it need not totally
defer to the special needs of the handicapped in setting the
number of hospital days its Medicaid program will cover.

I /]

V(
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5

Respondents contend that even if the Sixth Circuit were
wrong in concluding that a prima facie case had been established, review by this Court is premature given the fact that
no finding of ultimate discrimination has yet been made.
But it is entirely unclear just what the state could show on
remand, if anything, to avoid a finding of discrimination. In
the words of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals,
"[c]ombining an equality of results standard with the disparate impact test means the plaintiff always wins." 715 F. 2d
1047, 1049 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
I dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in this case.

s~~
k~ ·

To: "The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Jus tic~ Marshall
J usticei,Blackmun
J ustice'l Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Rehnquist
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Decided February-, 1984

JusTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR
joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari.
The State of Tennessee, represented in this lawsuit by
petitioner, restructured portions of its Medicaid Plan in response to budgetary constraints. One change made by the
state was to reduce the number of hospital days covered by
Medicaid from 20 to 14 in any one year. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that such an action was a
prima facie violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U. S. C. § 794, because statistical evidence introduced in the
District Court by respondents showed that a larger percentage of handicapped patients than of nonhandicapped patients
would be affected by the change in the number of hospital
days covered by the Plan.
More than one aspect of the decision of the Court of Appeals seems to me quite debatable. Last term in Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York,-U. S. - , 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), the Court attempted to
settle the question of whether a disparate adverse impact
theory is ever appropriate to establish a violation of Title VI,
42 U.S. C. §2000d, et seq., the statutory provision which
prohibits discrimination on account of race or national origin
in federally funded programs. 1 I continue to adhere to my
1
In Guardians Association seven members of the Court concluded that
a violation of Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent. 103
S. Ct. 3221, 3236 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE);
id., at 3237 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring); id., at 3237-3239 (O'CONNOR, J .,
concurring); id., at 3249, 3253 (STEVENS , J., dissenting, joined by BREN-

I
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view that that theory is inapplicable to cases alleging racial
and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI, and
I would also hold that it is inapplicable to cases alleging
handicap discrimination in violation of § 504, a statute which
is modeled after Title VI. SeeS. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6390-6391, reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 6373.
The operative language of § 504 provides that no handicapped individual shall "solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance .... " 29 U. S. C.
§ 794. This does not seem to me to be the language of "disparate impact." The Court of Appeals relied on decisions relating to Title VI, and to the regulations promulgated under
§ 504, describing the latter as specifically forbidding "the use
of federal funds for programs which have discriminatory effects against the handicapped." 715 F. 2d 1036, 1041. Even
if I believed that those regulations, set forth in the margin, 2
NAN and BLACKMUN, JJ.) . Two members of the Court concluded that a
violation of Title VI may be established by proof of discriminatory impact
alone, id. , at 3222-3227 (WHITE, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court); id. , at 3239-3244 (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting) , but one of those two
concluded that only noncompensatory relief could be awarded for such a
violation. !d., at 3232-3235 (WHITE , J. , announcing the judgment of the
Court). Finally, three members of the Court concluded that a violation of
the regulations promulgated under Title VI may be established by proof of
discriminatory impact. !d., at 3253-3255 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined
by BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ.).
2
45 CFR 84.4 (1983), provides in relevant part:
§ 84.4 Discrimination prohibited.
(a) General. No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity which
receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance. ·
(b)(4) A recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the

'

••..

' .
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could validly proscribe conduct beyond that which § 504 itself
proscribes, I do not believe that they support the result
reached by the Court of Appeals in this case. I do not believe that Tennessee's decision to reduce spending across the
board on a broadly available program of medical benefits is
impermissible under either the statute or its regulations.
It is undisputed that Tennessee proposed to reduce the
number of inpatient hospital days from 20 to 14 days per year
solely because of the state's need to implement budget cuts. 3
To establish that Tennessee's facially neutral proposal nonetheless would have a disparate impact on handicapped individuals, respondents produced evidence showing that for fiscal year 1979-1980, the percentage of handicapped recipients
who would not be served by the proposed 14 days of inpatient
care was almost four times greater than the percentage of
nonhandicapped recipients who would not be served by 14
days. 518 F. Supp. 877, 880-881.
Given their special medical needs, however, it is not surprising that respondents' statistics indicate that handicapped
individuals as a class will require more hospital days than will
nonhandicapped individuals to order to maintain their health.
Yet in my view the state has no statutory obligation to ensure that its Medicaid program is equally effective for handicapped and nonhandicapped recipients so long as its program
effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the
basis of handicap, (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's
program with respect to handicapped persons, or (iii) that perpetuate the
discrimination of another recipient if both recipients are subject to common
administrative control or are agencies of the same State.
3
As the Sixth Circuit recognized:
"The evidence presented showed that the Medicaid program would have
required $42,000,000 additional dollars to maintain the same level of services during fiscal year i980-81 as were provided in fiscal year 1979-80.
Since the state of Tennessee is prohibited by statute from deficit spending
in its Medicaid program, it must provide services within the means granted
by its General Assembly." 715 F . 2d 1036, 1044 (1983).

' -
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is equally accessible to both groups. In analyzing respondents' statistics, the District Court correctly noted that in this
case the "alleged problem is not with access, but with the end
result .... [N]either the statute nor the accompanying regulations require a program to achieve identical results for
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons." Id., at 883.
The Sixth Circuit majority rejected the District Court's view
of the Act, stating that the Act's "objective is to afford the
best cure, therapy, or preventative treatment that the allotted funds can provide." 715 F. 2d, at 1043, n. 8. Thus a
statute designed only to assure equal access for the handicapped to all federally funded programs has been converted
by the Court of Appeals into a statute requiring the state to
take affirmative action to ensure that whatever funds the
state allots maximize the medical benefit to the handicapped.
I believe that such an interpretation fundamentally misconstrues Congress's purpose in passing the Rehabilitation Act.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397,
410-411 (1979), we distinguished even-handed treatment of
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, action which the
Act does require, from affirmative action to accommodate
the special needs of the handicapped, action which the Act
does not require. See also Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 27 (1981). The regulations promulgated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act state specifically
that a federally funded program is not "required to produce
the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped
and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped
persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result." 45
CFR § 84.4(b)(2) (1983). Undoubtedly Tennessee can satisfy
that objective by providing that Medicaid will pay for the
same number of inpatient hospital days for handicapped as
for nonhandicapped individuals; in my view it need not totally
defer to the special needs of the handicapped in setting the
number of hospital days its Medicaid program will cover.

I

ALEXANDER v. JENNINGS

.

5

Respondents contend that even if the Sixth Circuit were
wrong in concluding that a prima facie case had been established, review by this Court is premature given the fact that
no finding of ultimate discrimination has yet been made.
But it is entirely unclear just what the state could show on
remand, if anything, to avoid a finding of discrimination. In
the words of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals,
"[c]ombining an equality of results standard with the disparate impact test means the plaintiff always wins." 715 F. 2d
1047, 1049 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
I dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in this case.

'
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No. 83-727, Alexander, Governor of Tennessee v. Jennings, et al.

,.,'I'

Memorandum for the File

This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary
reading of the briefs.
As I will need a bench memo in this case, I will do little
more now than identify the question and indicate
arguments of the parties.

briefly the

The case involves the interpretation

of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and regulations promulgated
under it.

Section 504 provides in relevant part:
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual *** shall, solely by reason of his handicap,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance***."

The question actually presented by this case is whether
Tennessee's fourteen day limit on Medicaid coverage for in-patient
hospital care has a disparate impact on the handicapped so as to
constitute a prima facie violation of § 504.
Tennessee provision).

(See below for the

The petition for cert presents, as a separate

and antecedent question) whether a "disparate impact or effects test"
is appropriate to determine a violation of § 504 and regulations
thereunder.

But this issue was not argued or decided by either of

~.
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i,

the courts below.

The SG' s amicus brief states that '! he assumes

for purposes of this case that a showing of "disparate effects"
could - in a proper case - constitute a prima facie violation.
The SG's "assumption" in this respect includes both the possibility
that§ 504 itself may require "disparate effects", or that the
numerous agency regulations (more than 24 in all!) under§ 504
prohibit states from establishing criteria that have the "purpose
or effect" of discriminating against the handicapped.
The SG therefore addresses only whether the Tennessee plan
does have a disparate impact or effect, and argues that it does
not.

The SG bases his argument primarily on the fact that Tennessee's

14-day limitation on hospital care provides identical benefits for
all individuals
- whether handicapped or not - who are eligible for
,...____---,
Medicaid.

Tennessee's Action

L:J

Medica.e, ' of course, is a joint federal-state program under
Title XIX of the Social Security Act.

Because of the seriously

adverse effect on Tennessee's budget of the ever increasing cost
of Medicaid, the state adopted changes in its program - to go into
effect August 15, 1980 - that would reduce the number of in-patient
hospital days provided in a fiscal year to each eligible recipient
from 20 to 14.

This suit was instituted by a class of handicapped

No. 83-727
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,.,I,
Medicaid recipients to enjoin the proposed reduction.

The state's

brief says that the "Tennessee Medicaid program faced a fiscal
crisis; that the General Assembly had appropriated in combined
state and federal funds $388,000,000, an increase of some
$26,000,000 over the preceding year.

Respondents, plaintiffs in

the law suit, claimed that the effect of the change is to discriminate unlawfully against the handicapped recipients.

Statistical

evidence showed that of the total number of Medicaid recipients who
used hospital care 92 per cent of the non-handicapped would have
been fully served by 14 days of coverage, whereas only 72.6 per cent
of the handicapped would have been fully served.

Thus, 27.4 of the

handicapped users of this service, as opposed to 7.8 per cent of
the non-handicapped users, required some hospitalization for which
they would not be reimbursed under the 14 day limit.

The Decisions Below
The DC rejected respondent's argument.

It held that the

proportionately greater hospital use by handicapped Medicaid
claimants was not necessarily attributable to their handicaps;
that the plan was neutral on its face, applying alike to handicapped and non-handicapped, and that the statistical disparity
"did not amount to discrimination" under § 504.

No. 83-727
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On appeal, CA 6 held that respondent 1 had shown a disparate
impact, and therefore established a prima facie case.

The case

therefore was remanded to determine whether the state could rebut
the prima facie case.

Arguments of the Parties
Since its inception in 1969, Tennessee had provided 20 days
of in-patient hospital care per fiscal year.

Apparently it is

agreed that neither the statute nor the regulations require state
programs to provide any specific number of days so long as the
limit is reasonable "in amount, duration, and scope."

The number

of in-patient hospital days covered varies from state to state
depending on several factors, including what other services are
provided.

Most states do provide more than 14 days.

One table

suggests that only Idaho has as few as 14.
The state's principal argument is that Congress intended to
prohibit only ''intentional" discrimination when it inacted
an intent evident from the language of

§

§

504,

504 that is "almost

identical to Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964"

(prohibiting

discrimination against minorities in federally funded programs).
See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Daronne,

(my decision last Term).

Since the 14 day limit is applied even-handedly to all Medicaid

No. 83-727

5.
:,

,I
claimants, there is no discrimination.

It is argued that a

"contrary ruling would attribute to Congress the unlikely intent
to afford greater protection to the handicapped under § 504 than
minorities are provided under Title VI".
The SG makes a somewhat more sophisticated argument, although
basically it agrees with the state that the "disparate" impact or
effect argument is "legally insufficient because the state plan
offers the same benefits to all Medicaid eligibles, handicapped
and non-handicapped alike."
trary (2-1),

The Court of Appeals' view to the con-

that the handicapped are affected "more harshly than

others", rests on the assumption that the "benefit Tennessee is
conferring is not a fixed amount of health services, but the
satisfaction of health needs."

That is, CA 6's view assumes that

because the handicapped may need more hospitalization than nonhandicapped, the effect of equal treatment is itself discriminatory.
The respondents, of course, take a very different view.

Their

brief repeatedly states that it was conceded by Tennessee, and by
both of the courts below, "that § 504 applied to practices which
have the effect of discriminating against the handicapped."

Again,

respondents state that "petitioners again conceded (before CA 6)
that§ 504 applied to practices with a discriminatory effect".
See p. 2-4 of Brief.

No. 83-727
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Respondents speaking of concessions, apparently ' concede
that the statutory language does not support their view:
§

"Whether

504 applies to practices with a discriminatory effect cannot be

resolved by reference to statutory language."

But 24 federal

agencies "have issued regulations under § 504 which apply
it to practices with a discriminatory effect", and respondents
cite my opinion in Consolidated Rail as requiring "particular
deference" to these regulations.

Finally, respondents argue:

"Even if § 504 itself forbids only practices
with a discriminatory purpose, the discriminatory effect regulations are nonetheless valid
as reasonably related to the statute."
Citing Guardian Association v. Civil Service Commission (the case
in which the Court split into several factions, including Justice
Stevens' view that the regulations controlled regardless of what
the statute provides).

* * *
I am not at rest.

The state's argument that the statute leaves

the number of days of care for each state to decide, so long as the
number is reasonable, is rather persuasive.

There is nothing in the

statute that supports respondents, and it can be argued that the
language of the statute itself controls this case - a possibility that

No. 83-727
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If one agrees with this view, ] t would be diffi-

cult for me to conclude that agency regulations can add a substantive
provision to a statute.

It probably is quite true that even in states

that provide more than 14 days of care (e.g. Tennessee prior to the
1980 change), disabled persons more frequently requires additional days
than non-disabled persons.

Yet, neither the statute nor the regu-

lations (to the extent I am familiar with them) require any more
than that the care be "reasonable".
20 is reasonable and 14 is not?

Query whether one can say that

I will be interested in my clerk's

views after he or she has taken a closer look at this case.

L.F.P •

.
,

alb 09/06/84

.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

September 6, 1984

Lee

No. 83-727, Alexander v. Choate

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Does Section 504 of

having a
II.

If

~isparate
Sections

the Rehabilitation Act prohibit actions

impact" upon handicapped persons?

504 does prohibit actions

having

a

"disparate

impact," have the plaintiffs shown such an impact?

BACKGROUND
I. Statutory Background
Section 504 of the Rehablitation Act of 1973 provides in
pertinent part:

};'

..

"'•

No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States, as defined in section 706(7} qf this
title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the Untied States Postal
Service.

29

u.s.c.

§794.
The United States Department of Health,

Welfare,

a

principal

source

of

federal

adopted V:.egulations

implementing

regulations address

~~r ~nation

.0general

1n

programs.

terms
Section

an

in

the

84.52(a},

Education, and

financial

section

504

in

assistance,
1977.

The

against the handicapped both

conte~

which

is

of
one

specific
of

the

t~es

of

specific

regulations dealing with "Health, Welfare, and Social Services,"
provides as follows:

/ h er soc1a
. 1 serv1ces
.
In providing vheal th, ~elf are, or ot
or benefits, a recipient may not, on the basis of
handicap:
~

(1}
Deny a qualified handicapped person these
benefits or services;
(2}
Afford a qualified handicapped person an
opportunity to receive benefits or services that is not
equal to that offered to nonhandicapped persons;
(3} Provide a qualified handicapped person with
benefits or services that are not as effective (as
defined in §84.4(b}}
as the benefits or services
provided to others;
(4} Provide benefits or services in a manner that
limits or has the effect of limiting the participation
of qualified handicapped persons; or
(5}
Provide different or separate benefits or
services to handicapped persons except where neccesary
to provide qualified handicapped persons with benefits
and services that are as effective as those provided to
others.

~.

45 C.F.R. §84.52(a).
The

il

----

requirement

that

handicapped

------

persons

Be

provided

with benefits that are as "effective" as those provided to others
is modified

by

§84. 4 (b)

--======--~
the regulations, w.Meh provides

of

in

pertinent part:

[A]ids,
benefits,
and
services,
to
be
equally
effective, are not required to produce the identical
result or level of acheivement for handicapped persons,
but mu t aff rd handicap ed persons equal opportunity
to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, to
reach the same level of acheivement, in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs.

45 C.F.R. §84.4(b) (2).

II. Factual Background
The

Tennessee~edicaid Program~is

a comprehensive scheme

designed to provide health care to indigent citizens.
§14-23-101, et. seq.
State

of

See T.C.A.

The program, which is funded jointly by the
------~

Tennessee

and

the

federal

government,
J }

assistance

to

eligible

individuals

needing

--

provides
, ,

inpatient

hospital

care, physician services, prescription drugs, nursing home care,
laboratory services,

and numerous outpatient clinical services.

The program's budget in fiscal year 1979-1980 was approximately
$365

million,

70

percent

of

which

came

from

the

federal

government.
Due

to

the

rising

cost

of

health

care,

Medicaid

program officials predicted that $430 million would be needed to
provide

the

-

·"'·

same

level

of

benefits

to

the

same

number

of

... .,
h

'

•,

.,

in

individuals

, Therefore',

1980-1981.

year

fiscal

when

the

~~

legislature's

Tennessee

--

- ~~-

program's budget
aware of

the

officials

The

Medicaid was
year.

need

decided

services.

appropriation

for

1980-19lh

~~-------

about

$38~~on,

set

state officials

the ~

becam~

to implement cost-cutting measures.

Program

to

se~

reduce

number

reduced

of
from

the

level of benefits

inpatient
20 per

hospital

for

days

fiscal year

covered

to 14 per

.

by

fiscal~

It was anticipated that th1s change alone would save the

state almost $13 million.

The proposed reduction was to become ~

1;:;:14

effective on August 15, 1980.

III. The Decisions Below
A. The District Court's Decision
On

August

14,

1980,

1~./J.
> 1'-)~
v~ f~ ~~~~

lv

,_,'

action

was

this

.. 11 . . I

brought

in

the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee
on behalf of the state's Medicaid recipients.

Although all of

the changes proposed by the state were challenged, by the time of
' '-

the only remainin~issue was the
.....
validity of the proposed reduction in the number of hospital days
the district court's decision,

covered by Medicaid.

The plaintiffs contended that this change

violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29

----

u.s.c.

§794, as it had a disparate impact upon handicapped persons.
~-

"'-

plaintiffs

noted

that

if

one

considered

only

those

The

Medicaid

recipients who needed at least one day of inpatient hospital care
in

fiscal

year

1979-1980,

27.7

percent

the

"handicapped"

individuals needed more than fourteen days of inpatient care.
contrast,

only

7.8

~~
~

percent

of

the

"non-handicapped"

In

persons

.Jo

within

same

this

group

needed

I

fourteen

th~n

more

days

of

11

,.1

hospitalization.

The d~urt assumed that Section 504 applied to

~

ll

1.

-

practices that adversely affecte~ the handicapped.

Nevertheless,

;(\

AY

C

it held that the plaintiffs' Section 504 claim should be rejected
for two reasons.

First, the DC stated that although the fourteen

---------

day

rule

might

have

had

an

adverse

impact

upon

handicapped

persons in fiscal year 1979-1980, there was no reason to believe
that it would have such an effect in future years.
trial
not

co~t~oncluded

------

apply

to

'

the

Second, the

that Section 504 and the regulations did

type

of

adverse

impact

that

the

~------------------------~

reduction in hospital benefits might cause.

'---------------------------------~
arguing
that the hospital benefits were

The plaintiffs were

not

as

effective

meeting the medical needs of handicapped persons.

-

however, was never

proposed

in

Section 504,

intended to ensure equality of results.

The

DC noted that this case was clearly distinguishable from those in
which

the

exclusion

alleged
of

"disparate

the

impact"

handicapped

from

amounted

the

service

to

an

or

outright

benefit

in

question.

B. The Sixth Circuit's Decision~
On

J

appeal,

a

three-judge

C. A~
of 1\ t:he United

panel

reversed
/

Ceert

court's

ruling

and

remanded

the

case

for

further

the

prohibits

that

facially

Section

neutral

504

of

policies

the
that

district

proceedings.

Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983).
held

Sta~

~~~f.r.:t

Rehabilitation
affect

Act

handic pped

.

·;

....

persons more harshly than others.

Citing , NAACP v. ' The Medical
il

1981}

Center, Inc., 657 F2d

{en bane} , tlhe CA noted

u.s.c.

that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42
only that a

"plaintiff prove a disparate

Rehabilitation Act was

"predicated"

§2000d, requires

impact."

upon Title VI,

necessarily incorporates the same effects test.
stated

that

explicitly

the

regulations

adopt

a

promulgated

"disparate

Because the

impact"

The CA further

under

test.

Section 504

Section

CA6

504

refused

to

After deciding that Section 504 prohibits policies that
have a disparate

impact upon handicapped persons,

the court of

appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie
case.

The

statisi tical evidence,

medical

testimony,

showed

affect

handicapped

persons

Moreover,

individuals.

that

CA6

when coupled with the expert
the

proposed

reduction

more

harshly

than

held

that

state had

the

rebut the plaintiffs' prima facie case.

would

non-handicapped
failed

to

Therefore, the court of

appeals remanded the case to the district court to give the state
an

opportunity

justification

to

for

show

the

that

adoption

there
of

the

was

"some

plan

with

substantial
the

greater

discriminatory impact."

V Judge

Merritt

Although

decision.

he

dissented
did

not

from

dispute

the
the

Sixth

Circuit's

majority's

holding

that a disparate impact test could be used under section 504, he
stated that such a test was appropriate only when the challenged
action
Section

denied
504

the

was

handicapped

intended

to

an

opportunity

secure

for

the

to

participate.

handicapped

equal

~

access

to

federally

funded

programs,

not , equal

re's ul ts.

The

~~

majority's reasoning,

the dis sent argued,

Congress

was

of

treatment

of

efforts

to

Southeastern
(1979). (

aware

the

qualified
overcome
Community

distinction

handicapped

the

ignored th'~ fact that

persons

disabilities

College

v.

between
and

affirmative

by

handicaps."

caused

Davis,

"evenhanded

442

u.s.

397,

410

~ ~)

DISCUSSION
I. Disparate Impact Theory Under Section 504
The
use

of

~ate

federal

argues that Section 504 does not prohibit the

funds

in

a manner

that merely has

a

disparate

impact upon handicapped persons.

Under its view, a recipient of '" (,..

federal

found

funds

should

not

be

in

violation

of

the

Rehabilitation Act unless it intentionally discriminates against
the

handicapped.

In

IE:;Iiard ians

Association

v.

Civil

Service

Comm'n of New York, 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983), seven Justices stated
that

Title

VI

must

be

construed

purposeful discrimination.

so

as

to

proscribe

only

Section 504 was modeled after Title

VI of the Civil Rights Act, 1

and this Court has repeatedly noted

the similarity between the two statutes.

Consolidated Rail Corp.

v.

Therefore,

Darrone,

52

U.S.L.W.

4301

•

J,t ~~"'

(1984).

it

would

be

1 In its discussion of the Technical a~~larifying Amendments
to the Rehabilitation Act in 1974, the Senate Report stated that
"Section 504 was patterned after and is almost identical to, the
ant1 1scrim1nat1on lan uage o sec 10n
of the Civil Rights
Acto 196 .
s. Rep. No.
7, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6390-91,
reprinted in 1974 u.s. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6373.

~

~

~

Uo

I

perfectly

logical

hold

inte~tional

prohibits only
The

to

state

that

Section ,504,

like

that

VI,

•'\

discrimination.

recognizes

Title
il

many

of

the

regulations

implementing Section 504 prohibit the use of federal funds in a
manner

that

has

a

l'L
disparate

.
"" upon
1mpact

h an d'1cappe d

persons.

The state reasonably argues that such regulations are invalid, ~f~~~'
they go beyond the statute,

rather than simply "furthering it."

Therefore, the regulations do not necessarily prevent this Court
from

holding

that

impact

disparate

the

theory

has

no

applicability to claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act.
Although

the

state's

argument

is

plausible,

both

the

district court and the Sixth Circuit assumed that a violation of
the Rehabilitation Act could be based upon a finding of disparate
impact. 2

Moreover, there are three other reasons why this Court

should not hold that Section 504 and its implementing regulations
bar only intentional discrimination:

(1)

the legislative history

of the Rehabilitation Act differs from that of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act, suggesting that the two statutes may well have
different standards of liability;

(2)

that Section 504 prohibits actions
upon
held

the

handicapped;

that

Section

discrimination,

and
504

another

(3)
is

the lower courts have held

that have an adverse

impact

even if a majority of the Court
concerned

only

with

majority probably would

intentional

hold

that

2 Apparantly, at trial and before CA6, the state conceded that
Section 5 4 rohibited at east some actions that would~have a
dis~ upon the han

the

--(~

.
· at ions['{\ are

nevertheless

, valid.

----

il

considerations will be discussed below.

..//

().

possible
need

that

not

the

under

prove

two statutes
Section

that

the

504,

,

c~

~~w(.

/]AA)f

---

unlike Title VI,
had

a

plaintiff

discriminatory

~

~

it is

are nearly identical,

recipient

~f.,VVV

./lA}-"" ...

A. Legislative History of Section 504
Although

bJ

~~~
These
three ~
rv
··j

/
"effects"

~

~vv

vft~ .

intent.

This seeming anomoly can be explained by the fact that the two
statutes

have

entirely [different

enacting

Title

VI,

racial

Congress

classifications

intended

Bakke ,

Title

VI

438

U• S .

prohibits

Washington v.

Davis,

that

504

Section

strained

because

to

proscribe

that would violate

Clause or the Fifth Amendment.
v•

legislative ~torie~

26 5 ,

426

( 19 7 8)

( Po we 11 ,

intentional

u.s.

adopted

Equal

those

Protection

University of California Regents

287

only

the

only

In

229

this

handicapped

racial

(1976).

same

J •) •

discrimination.

Tennessee's argument

constitutional

persons

Therefore,

are

not

standard

treated

is

as

"suspect class" and have no special constitutional protections.

c---

Not surprisingly, the legislative history of Section 504 contains
no references to recognized constitutional standards.
The

state's

"Title

VI

argument"

becomes

even

less

persuasive when it is remembered that the Rehabilitation Act was
passed in 1973.

At that time, the agencies responsible for the

implementation of Title VI had construed it as having adopted an
"effects"

standard.

29

Fed.

Reg.

the critical inquiry is "what
was," Brown v. G.S.A., 425

u.s.

16274-16305

[Congress']

(1964).

Because

perception of the law

820, 828 (1976), it seems likely

.....

that

Section

504

was

intended

prohi~it

to

actions

having

a

;I

disparate impact upon the handicapped.

Moreover, the ' bomments of
'--~
' -----

the legislators indicate they were concerned about "unintentional

-----------~~~
•
Senator~mpflr~y":J for example,
the

bill,

eliminate

stated
the

procedures."

that

in introducing

tne ·-Renabili tat ion Act was designed

"discriminatory

effect

of

118 Cong. Rec. 525-26 (1972)

job

to

qualification

(emphasis added).

In summary, the similarity between Title VI and Section
504

does

not

necessarily

suggest

that

the

latter

concerned only with intentional discrimination.
in

the

legislative

histories

of

the

two

statute

is

The differences

statutes

make

such

a

conclusion questionable.

B. The Lower Courts
It appears that all of the lower courts considering the
issue have assumed
disparate
Medical

impact

Center,

that Section 504 prohibits actions having a

upon
657

handicapped

F. 2d

persons.

1322 @ c i r .

1981)

In

NAACP
(en

v.

The

bane) ,

for

example, the Third Circuit considered a challenge by handicapped
persons

to

the

relocation

of

a

medical

facility.

The

court

stated that under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiffs were not
required to show intentional discrimination. 3

Nevertheless, CA3

3 The court's reasoning was dependent upon Title VI, which the
Third Circuit interpreted as prohibiting "disparate impacts."
After Guardians, it is questionable whether the Third Circuit
would hold that Section 504 reaches beyond intentional
discrimination.

<

..

1-f H li

held

that

the

plaintiffs

had

not made ou ,t

a

prima ' facie

case

~~

because

they

failed

introduce

to

cred ibl~

any

evidence

establishing the residential distribution of handicapped persons
within the county.
In Lloyd v.
1277

~r.

brought

Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d

1977) ,

under

the Seventh Circuit considered an action

Section

504

on

behalf

of

all

mobility-disabled

persons in the northeastern region of Illinois.

The plaintiffs

contended that because of their physical disabilities, they were
unable to use

the public transportation system operated by the

two municipal defendants.
the

defendants

had

Although there was no allegation that

intentionally

discriminated

against

the

handicapped, CA7 held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of
~

action

under

regulations.

the
The

Rehabilitation
Seventh

Act

Circuit

and

its

therefore

implementing

gave

at

least

implicit recognition to the "disparate impact" theory.
This court obviously is not bound by any of the lower
court

decisions,

Nevertheless,
held

that

a

including

the

discussed

two

above.

it is noteworthy that not one court of appeals has
plaintiff

under

Section

504

is

required

to prove

discriminatory intent.

c.

The Regulations
Even

if

this

Court

were

to

hold

prohibits only intentional discrimination,

that

Section

504

the Sixth Circuit's

reliance upon the "disparate impact" test would not necessarily
be

improper.

Many of

the regulations

implementing Section 504

.
.

'

;.

'·

'

·.·
,._

reach

conduct

handicapped

that

has

persons.

only

For

discri~inatory

a

example,

one

of

effect

upon

,·~ egulations ~

the

provides that a recipient must not provide health services "in a
manner

that

limits

participation

of

§84.52(a) (4)

or

has

qualified

(emphasis

the

effect

handicapped

added) •

In

of

limiting
45

persons."

fact,

the -

C.F.R.

according

to

the

Solicitor General, at least 24 federal agencies have regulations
that incorporate the "disparate impact" test. See
n. 2.
that

Therefore,
has

a

the

application of

discriminatory

prohibited,

if

even

effect

Section

federal

upon

504

the

is

u.s.

funds

Brief 1-2

in a manner

handicapped

concerned

may

only

be

with

intentional discrimination.
In Guardians, Justice O'Connor persuasively argues that
\:......_;

administrative

regulations

incorporating

an

"effects"

standard

should not be upheld when the underlying statute proscribes only
intentional

discrimination.

Guardians

Comm'n

New

S.Ct.

of

concurring) •
"further"

York,

She

103

states

the purpose of

purpose.

Justice

that
the

O'Connor

Assoc.

3221,

such

v.

3237

Service

(O'Connor,

regulations

statute;

Civil

do

not

simply

they go well beyond

acknowledges

that

J.,

its

administrative

regulations are upheld when they are "reasonably related" to the
purposes

of

Publications
states,

the

Service,

however,

reasonably

enabling

related

that
to

Inc.,

411

the
the

statute.

u.s.

"effects"

purposes

of

v.

Mourning
356,

369

(1973).

regulations
Title

VI.

Family

are

She
not

A contrary

holding, she warns, would give administrative agencies discretion
to proscribe conduct that Congress did not intend to prohibit. 4

Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages .

.

';;<~~~;Y," .. ~
>.

~

In his Guardians dissent, Justice $tevens disagrees with
il

Justice O'Connor.

103 S.Ct. at 3249

(Stevens,

J., Ci)issenting).

He argues that a regulation prohibiting disparate effects might
be

valid,

even

if

the

underlying

statute

proscribes

only

intentional discrimination. In support of his position, he points
to

several

prohibited

cases

in

conduct

which

that

a

was

regulation
not

upheld

proscribed

by

the

explicitly

Court
by

the

enabling statute.

Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,

411 u.s.

(1973).

United

356,

369

States,

446

reasonableness of
the

Court

prohibits

held
only

He also argues that City of Rome v.

u.s.

the
that

156,

173-178

agencies'
even

purposeful

if

(1980),

regulations.
§1

racial

of

the

illustrates

the

In City of Rome,
Fifteenth

discrimination,

Amendment

Congress

may

implement that prohibition by banning voting practices that are
discriminatory in effect. 5
Although
better

it seems to me

argument,~

least

that Justice O'Connor has the
five

Justices

believe

that

4 In a footnote, you approved of Justice O'Connor's analysis.
}
Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York City, 103
s.ct at 3237 n.5 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).

~~

I

5 Justice Stevens cites Boske v. Comingore, 177 u.s. 459, 470
(1900), for the proposition that "an administrative regulation's
conformity to statutory authority [is] to be measured by the same
standard as a statute's conformity to constitutional authority."
Justice O'Connor disputes this conclusion, stating that the
"breadth of authority granted to Congress under the enabling
provision of the Fifteenth Amendment is not equivalent to the
amount of discretion that an administrative agency possesses in
implementing the provisions of a federal statute." Although this
may well be true, Justice O'Connor does not explain adequately
why this is so.

"'·

,.

,-

administrative

regulations

may

prohibit,

actions

having

a

)I

disparate

impact,

even

if

the

statute '1 does

enabling

not.

Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens'

Guardians

dissent.

opinions,

Justices

White

and

Marshall,

in

separate

likewise stated that such regulations were valid,
reasonably related to the statute's purpose.
n.2

(White,

J.);

dissenting).
this

case

find

s.ct.

at

3244-3245

103 s.ct. at 3223

n.l5

(Marshall,

J.,

Therefore, the Court will not be able to dispose of
simply

intentional
adopt a

103

as they were

by

holding

discrimination.

"disparate

illegal

at

impact"

least

some

that

Section

Because
test,

the

504

regulations

a majority of

actions

that

bars

only

clearly

the Court will

adversely

affect

the

that

the

handicapped.

II. What Constitutes a Disparate Impact?

The

Court

probably

avoid

holding

disparate impact theory is inapplicable to claims brought under
Section 504.

The courts below did not address this issue, and it

is

plausible

at

least

proscibe

actions

that

that

Congress

have

a

intended

disparate

the

impact

statute
upon

to
the

handicapped. Moreover, even if the statute is concerned only with
intentional
valid

the

discrimniation,
implementing

disparate impact theory.

five

Justices

regulations,

which

probably
have

will

find

incorporated

a

Instead, this Court should reverse the

Sixth Circuit on another ground.

The Court should hold that the

.L.Jo

I

plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the

s~ate's

pro~osed

will have ~'disparate impact" upon the handicapped.
L

-

action

,·!

--------------

In other cases recognizing a "disparate impact" theory,
the plaintiffs have shown that they were excluded from or denied
/

In ~riggs v. Duke Power Company, 401

access to a benefit.
424

(1971),

for

example,

the black plaintiffs showed

were excluded from certain job classifications.

-----------

plaintiffs

.....

in this case,

program do

that they

The handicapped

on the other hand, are not contending

that they were denied access to Medicaid benefits.
are arguing

u.s.

Instead, they

that the benefits provided by the state's Medicaid
not

-----------------------------------for the handicapped the same

acheive

results that are attained by the non-handicapped.

positive

The percentage

of handicapped persons who will have all of their hospital care
covered

under

corresponding
short,

the

the

state's

percentage

plai~iffs

are

implementing

is

a

much

lower

non-handicapped

~endl_ng

practical

regulations

proscribe disparate

is

that

than

individuals.

Section 504 and

reason

should

results.

not

Although

why
be

Section

504

interpreted

so

the
In

its~
~.

e~title t~l results~

implementing regulations
There

for

plan

and
as

~
its ·:e4~ .~..

to

~J-r.

it is easy to determine

whether a benefit has been distributed in an evenhanded fashion,
it is often difficult to decide whether each of the recipients
has

achieved

the

same

positive

result. 6

In

this

case,

for

6 For example, it is possible to ensure that everyone has equal
access to a a public school.
It is impossible to determine,
however, whether all of the students obtain equally positive
results from the classroom instruction.

-•.

.•

.l.Oo

I

example,

it

is

impossible

to

determine

whether

equal

results

jl

might be obtained under various schemes because ther~ is no way
of objectively measuring the "effectiveness" of the hospital care
provided.

This

explains

the

difficulty

plaintiffs'

in

quanitifying

failure

to

results

articulate

a

probably
method

of

limiting hospital coverage that would not have a disparate impact
upon the handicapped. 7
The plaintiffs'

T!$ ~ ~ ~J.;:;t.,

~

a--

~~~~~~~

interpretation of

impact~,..

the disparate

test is not only unworkable, but it is also inconsistent with the
legislative
courts,

history

and

legislative

the

history

of

Section

504,

implementing
of

Section

504

the opinions of

regulations.
suggests

that

the

lower

Although
Congress

the
was

concerned about disparate effects, there is no indication that it
intended

to

require

equality of results.

As discussed

above,

Senator Humphrey spoke out against job qualification procedures
that

have

a

disparate

impact upon

the

handicapped.

The other

7 Plaintiffs suggest that the state could limit the total number
of visits per annum, rather than the number of days. There is no
statistical evidence, however, that this plan would not have a
"disparate impact" upon the handicapped.
I think that the only way that the state might be able to
ensure "equal results," as defined by the plaintiffs, would be to
set up a scheme whereby a handicapped person is allowed to stay
in the hospital for a greater number of days per year than a
similarly situated nonhandicapped person. Unfortunately, if the
goal is to acheive equally effective cures for all Medicaid
patients, there will be insurmountable difficulties in trying to
quantify "eff ctiveness." Assume, for example, that a person
with emph s rna, under ideal conditions, would remain in the
hosp1 a fo~t~ Q~:s-rflne had~neumonia. A normal person
~~~--L~
would only need to be hosp1talizedo~ ten days.
If the state
--~~
has only enough money to pay for thiry days of hospital care for
both men combined, how would you allocate this amount so as to
provide an "equally effective" cure to both patients?

....-,

.1 I •

I

relevant

legislative

history

similarly

suggests

intended to proscibe only those actions
of

excluding

handicapped

persons

that

Congress

that have the

"effect"

from

~

participation

in

the

federally funded program.
The
disparate

lower

impact

court

cases

theory have

assuming

involved

the

existence

situations

of

in which

a
the

plaintiffs allegedly were denied access to or were excluded from
participation in the government sponsored program.
The Medical Center, 657 F. 2d 1322

(3d Cir. 1981)

In NAACP v.
(en bane), for

example, the handicapped plaintiffs contended that they would be
denied

access

to

the

hospital

location.

Similarly,

Authority,

548

F.2d

in
1277

plaintiffs

argued

they ' were

effectively

if

Lloyd
(7th

to a

v.

Transportation

Cir.

that because of
excluded

it were moved

1977),

their

from

system operated by the defendants.

Regional

the

the

suburban

handicapped

physical disabilities,
public

transportation

In neither case did the court

suggest that the recipient of federal funds might be required to
ensure that handicapped persons attained the same results as nonhandicapped individuals.
Although
Section

504

concerned
federally

many

adopt

with

a

the

sponsored

of

the

regulations

"disparate
exclusion
program.

impact"

of

test,

handicapped
One

promulgated
almost
persons

regulation,

for

under

all

are

from

the

example,

prohibits the provision of health care benefits in a manner that
"has

the

persons."

effect
See

of

limiting

45

C.F.R.

the

participation

§84.52(a) (4).

of

handicapped

Admittedly,

one

regulation states that handicapped persons must be provided with

..

.L_O •

I

health care

that

is as

"effective" as tha.t

provided, to others.
'I

See 45 C.F.R.

§84. 52 (a} (3}.

This regulation is quai'l fied by 45

C.F.R. §84.4(b} (2}, however, which provides:

[A]ids,
benefits,
and
services,
to
be
equally
effective, are not required to produce the identical
result or level of acheivement for handicapped persons,
but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity
to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, to
reach the same level of acheivement, in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs.

SUMMARY

There

is

no

support

for

the plaintiffs'

argument that

the proposed reduction from 20 to 14 days would violate Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
hospital care,
less

effective

handicapped

The provision of fourteen days of

the benefit being provided by the state, may be
in

persons.

meeting

all

of

Nevertheless,

the

health

nothing
__::::::::::s

..

in

care
the

needs

of

legislative

history of Section 504 suggests that Congress intended to ensure
equality of results in federally sponsored programs.

Equality of

results is an extremely costly, and in many cases unobtainable,
goal.

Congress chose to avoid the problem by proscribing only

those actions that have th.e effect of denying handicapped persons
access to a benefit or service. 8

8 section 504 does not proscribe all policies that exclude the
handicapped from federally sponsored programs.
In Southeastern
Footnote continued on next page.

.-

..

'·'

1~.

Community College v. Davis, 442 u.s. 397 (1979), the Court held
that professional schools are able to impose physical
qualifications for admission. The Court stated that Section 504
did not require an educational institution to modify
substantially its standards in order to accomodate a handicapped
person.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES V-~....,t-i~(
No. 83-727

~~

LAMAR ALEXANDER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF TENNESSEE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
HERSHEL CHOATE ET AL.

JLe

~

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ~_.,
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
() , ,- - ~~
[November-, 1984]

I- ,.."-~J ....

.-

~ tA.JYC./

__.,

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.
~
~ ~
In 1980, Tennessee proposed reducing the number of annual days of inpatient hospital care covered by its state Med- ~ J1ti.--Aicaid program. The question presented is whether the effect - -~
upon the handicapped that this reduction will have is cogni- It /1
zable under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or its im/
plementing regulations. We hold that it is not.

LYj..

7

I
Faced in 1980-1981 with projected state Medicaid 1 costs of
$42 million more than the state's Medicaid budget of $388 million, the directors of the Tennessee Medicaid program decided to institute a variety of cost-saving measures. Among
these changes was a reduction from 20 to 14 in the number of
inpatient hospital days per fiscal year that Tennessee Medic' Medicaid was established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act of
Medicaid is a joint state-federal funding program for medical assistance in which
the federal government approves a State plan for the funding of medical
services for the needy and then subsidizes a significant portion of the financial obligations the state has agreed to assume. Once a State voluntarily
chooses to participate in Medicaid, the State must comply with the requirements of Title XIX and applicable regulations. Harris v. McRae , 448
1965, 79 Stat. 343 and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et. seq. (1982).

u.

s. 297, 301 (1980).
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aid would pay hospitals on behalf of a Medicaid recipient.
Before the new measures took effect, respondents, Tennessee Medicaid recipients, brought a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief in which they alleged, inter alia,
that the proposed 14-day limitation on inpatient coverage
would have a discriminatory effect on the handicapped. The
basis for this claim was the position that the handicapped
need and utilize inpatient hosptial services for more than 14
days a year in significantly greater proportion than the nonhandicapped. Based on this position, respondents asserted
that the reduction would violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U. S.C. §794 (1982),and its implementing
regulations. 2 Section 504 provides tliat:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ....
29

u. s. c.

§ 794 (1982).
In a bench trial, respondents introduced statistical evidence that handicapped Medicaid recipients would be
signficantly more disadvantaged by the 14-day limitation
than would nonhandicapped recipients. For example, according to respondents' figures, 27.4% of the handicapped users of Tennessee Medicaid required some hospitalization for
which they would not be reimbursed under the 14-day rule,
while only 7.8% of the nonhandicapped would be similarly af2
The State proposed an array of other changes in its Medicaid program.
Although respondents challenged many of these other changes, settlement
was reached on all the proposed changes other than the reduction in the
number of inpatient days covered. Thus none of the other changes is before this Court. Respondents also asserted a number of causes of action
other than their § 504 claim in their original and amended complaints.
These additional legal theories are similarly not before the Court.
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fected. 3 Respondents then argued that their showing that
the 14-day limit would have a disparate impact upon the
handicapped established a prima facie violation of § 504 and
its implementing regulations. 4
In addition, respondents pointed to a variety of ways the
State might reduce its Medicaid expenditures to the legislas Based on respondents' submissions the district court made the following findings: 18.5% of the handicapped who were eligible for assistance
under the Tennessee Medicaid program actually used Medicaid for one or
more days of inpatient care, as compared to 13.6% ofnonhandicapped eligibles. For the fiscal year preceding the effective date of the proposed
changes, 26.5% of the 341,960 individuals eligible for Medicaid in Tennessee, and 33% of those who used one or more days of inpatient hospital care,
were handicapped. At the same time, 63.4% of Medicaid recipients who
needed more than 14 days of inpatient care were handicapped, and only
72.6% of the handicapped, as compared to 92.2% of the nonhandicapped,
would have been fully served by 14 days of coverage. The district court
but
questioned the meaningfulness of these findings, see infra, at p.
the findings themselves have not been challenged.
Since the district court's decision, the state has amended its Medicaid
program in two minor ways not materially significant to the issues presented on certiorari.
'The lower courts, as well as the parties, have treated the class of
"handicapped" Medicaid recipients as consisting entirely of those individuals who receive Medicaid benefits solely on the basis of blindness or disability. See J. A. at 40. However, the class of "handicapped" persons
protected by § 504 is much broader than that group. Section 504 protects
individuals fully capable of engaging in "substantial gainful activity," 42
U. S. C. 1382c(3)(A), who have either (i) a physical or mental impairment
(or a record of such an impairment) which is regarded as limiting their ability to work, or (ii) a physical or mental impairment (or a record of such an
impairment) which substantially limits (or is regarded as limiting) some
other "major life activit[y]." 29 U. S. C. 706(7)(B). Thus, for example,
dyslexic and hearing-impaired individuals who receive Medicaid would be
"handicapped" under § 504, but would have been included in the class of
nonhandicapped Medicaid recipients in the statistics used in the courts
below. In spite of this incongruity, throughout the litigation the State has
conceded and the lower courts have found that the proposed reductions will
have a disparate impact on the handicapped as that group is defined by the
Rehabilitation Act, see 715 F. 2d, at 1042, n. 7, and we therefore proceed
on that basis.

-f=,

83-727-0PINION
ALEXANDER~

4

CHOATE

tively-mandated level, some of which allegedly would have a
less disproportionate impact on the handicapped than the 14day limitation. Respondents acknowledged that virtually
any limitation on the number of inpatient days covered was
likely to disadvantage the handicapped disproportionately.
But respondents also noted that federal law does not require
states to impose any annual durationallimitation on inpatient
coverage, that the Medicaid programs of only ten states impose such restrictions, and that as of 1980 the average ceiling
in those states was 37.6 days. 5 Respondents thus suggested
that Tennessee follow the lead of other states and do away
with any limitation on the number of annual inpatient days
covered. Respondents proposed that the state instead limit
the number of days of hospital coverage on a per-stay basis,
with the number of covered days to vary depending on the
recipient's illness (for example, fixing the number of days
covered for an appendectomy); the period to be covered for
each illness could then be set at a level that would keep Tennessee's Medicaid program as a whole within its budget. 6
According to respondents, this alternative would not have a
disparate impact upon the handicapped. 7
The district court held that the State had no federal legal
obligation to consider these alternatives. At the outset, the
Six states also limit the number of reimbursable days per admission,
per spell of illness, or per benefit period. See Brief for the United States
App. B.
6
See Jennings v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 877, 883 n. 7 (M.D. Tenn.
1981). Respondents' diagnosis-related reimbursement proposal is supported by a committee of the Tennessee legislature, which has recommended that the state adopt such a plan. The Medicaid System of the
Tennessee Department of Public Health, A Report of the Special Joint
Committee to the Ninety-Third General Assembly, 24, 26 (1983). The
Court of Appeals seems to have mischaracterized this proposal of respondents as an attemp~ to limit "the total number of visits per annum rather
than the number of days." 715 F . 2d, at 1044.
7
Presumably, respondents assumed that the State would not discriminate against those illnesses most likely to be suffered by the handicapped.
5
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district court expressed some doubt about the accuracy and
significance of the figures offered by respondents to establish
their disparate impact claim. 8 Alternatively, the district
court reasoned that, even if the statistics established that the
handicapped would be disproportionately affected by the new
rule, the resulting disparate impact was "not the type of discrimination that§ 504 was intended to proscribe." Jennings
v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 877, 881 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). Accordingly, the district court rejected respondents' argument
that the 14-day rule was, prima facie, a violation of§ 504.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The majority first found that respondents'
statistical evidence had established that the proposed reduction would affect the handicapped significantly more than the
nonhandicapped. The majority apparently then concluded
that any action by a federal grantee that disparately affects
the handicapped states a cause of action under § 504 and its
implementing regulations. As a result, the Court of Appeals
held that respondents had established a prima facie violation
of § 504. The court remanded the case to the district court to
give Tennessee an opportunity to rebut respondents' prima
facie case. According to the panel majority, the State could
either demonstrate the unavailability of alternative plans
that would achieve the State's legitimate cost-saving goals
with a less disproportionate impact on the handicapped, or
the State could offer "a substantial justification for the adoption of the plan with the greater discriminatory impact."
8
The District Court found that "there was no evidence that the presence of handicaps was the reason that the handicapped group seemed to
require an average of more days of hospital care .... " 518 F. Supp., at
882. On this basis, the District Court stated that any disparate impact of
the 14-day limit on the handicapped could not be considered discrimination
"solely by reason of" being handicapped. Id; see 29 U. S. C. § 794. Because we reverse the Court of Appeals on other grounds, we do not address this alternative holding of the District Court. We note, however,
that this case does not involve services to the handicapped for which the
differential need is directly traceable to their handicapped condition.

..
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Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F. 2d 1036, 1046 (CA6 1983).
We granted certiorari to consider whether the type of impact
at issue in this case is cognizable under § 504 or its implementing regulations, and we now reverse.
II

The first question the parties urge on the Court is whether
proof of discriminatory animus is always required to establish
a violation of § 504 and its implementing regulations, or
whether federal law also reaches action by a recipient of federal funding that discriminates against the handicapped by
effect rather than by design. The State of Tennessee argues
that § 504 reaches only purposeful discrimination against the
handicapped. As support for this position, the State relies
heavily on our recent decision in Guardians Association v.
Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 103 S. Ct.
3221 (1983).
In Guardians, we confronted the question whether Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, et
seq., (1982), which prohibits discrimination against racial and
ethnic minorities in programs receiving federal aid, reaches
both intentional and disparate-impact discrimination. 9 No
9
Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d,
provides:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."
The premise of the State's reliance on Guardians is that § 504 was modelled in part on Title VI, and that the evolution of Title VI regulatory and
judicial law is therefore relevant to ascertaining the intended scope of
§ 504. We agree with this basic premise. See S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., 6390-91, reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6373 ("Section 504 was patterned after and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. 2000d-1 (relating to race, color, or national origin) and section 901
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U. S. C. 1683 (relating to sex)").
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opinion commanded a majority in Guardians, and members
of the Court offered widely varying interpretations of Title
VI. Nonetheless, a two-pronged holding on the nature of
the discrimination proscribed by Title VI emerged in that
case. First, the Court held that Title VI itself directly
reached only instances of intentional discrimination. 10 Second, the Court held that actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through
agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of
Title VI. 11 In essence, then, we held that Title VI had delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities
constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were
readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices
of the federal grantees that had produced those impacts.
Guardians, therefore, does not support petitioner's blanket proposition that federal law proscribes only intentional
discrimination against the handicapped. Indeed, to the extent our holding in Guardians is relevant to the interpretation of § 504, Guardians suggests at a minimum that the
regulations implementing § 504, upon which respondents in
part rely, could make actionable the disparate impact challenged in this case. 12 Moreover, there are reasons to pause
before too quickly extending even the first prong of GuardNonetheless, as we point out infra, at
and n. 13, too facile an assimilation of Title VI law to § 504 must be resisted.
10
103 S. Ct. at 3236-3237 (opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, in which THE
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined); id., at 3237 (opinion of
JUSTICE O'CONNOR); i d., at 3249 (opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, in which
JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN joined).
11
103 S. Ct. at 3232 (JUSTICE WHITE , announcing the judgment of the
Court); id., at 3244 n. 15 (opinion of JUSTICE MARSHALL); i d., at 3249
(opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, in which JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN joined).
12
See also Lau v. Nichols , 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (Stewart, J . , concurring). We conclude infra at~ that in this case the regulations do not in
fact support respondents' action.\ ,_ b _ ). g-

t .
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ians to § 504. Cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104
S. Ct. 1248 (1984) n. 13 (recognizing distinctions between
Title VI and § 504)_13
13
In addition to the nature of the problems with which the § 504 Congress was concerned, see infra
at least two other considerations
counsel hesitation before reading Title VI and § 504 in pari materia with
respect to the effect/intent issue. First, for seven Justices, the outcome in
the first prong of Guardians was settled by their view that a majority of
the Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S.
265 (1978) had already concluded that Title VI reached only intentional discrimination. See 103 S. Ct., at 3236 (opinion of JuSTICE POWELL, in
which 'l'HE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined); id., at 3237
(opinion of JUSTICE O'CONNOR); id. at 3253, and n. 12 (opinion of STEVENS,
BRENNAN, and BLACKMUN, JJ., dissenting). Although two of the five
Justices who were said to have reached such a conclusion in Bakke wrote in
Guardians to reject this interpretation of Bakke, see 103 S. Ct. at
3225-3226, and& n. 11 (WHITE, J ., announcing the judgment of the Court);
id. at 3240-3241 (MARSHALL, ,J ., dissenting), in the view of the seven Justices Bakke controlled as a matter of stare decisis. Had these Justices not
felt the force of this constraint, it is unclear whether they would have read
an intent requirement into Title VI. See id., at 3237 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Were we construing Title VI without the benefit of any prior interpretation from this Court, one might well conclude that
the staute was designed to redress more than purposeful discrimination.")
(citation omitted). For that reason, the conclusion that, in response to factors peculiar to Title VI, Bakke locked in a certain construction of Title VI
would not seem to have any obvious or direct applicability to § 504.
Second, by the time Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act in 1973,
nearly a decade of experience had been accumulated with the operation of
the nondiscrimination provisions of Titles VI and VII. By this time,
model Title VI enforcement regulations incorporating a disparate impact
standard had been drafted by a presidential task force and the Justice Department, and every Cabinet department and about forty federal agencies
had adopted standards in which Title VI was interpreted to bar programs
with a discriminatory impact. See Guardians , 103 S. Ct., at 3240-3241
(MARSHALL, J ., dissenting). These regulations provoked some controversy in Congress, and in 1966 the House of Representatives rejected a
proposed amendment that would have limited Title VI to only intentional
discrimination. /d., at 3241-42. Thus, when Congress in 1973 adopted
virtually the same language for § 504 that had been used in Title VI, Congress was well aware of the intent/impact issue and of the fact that similar

+•
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Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by
Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect. 14 Thus, Representative Vanik, introducing the
predecessor to § 504 in the House, 15 described the treatment
of the handicapped as one of the country's "shameful oversights," which caused the handicapped to live among society
"shunted aside, hidden, and ignored." 117 Cong. Rec. 45974
(1971). Similarly, Senator Humphrey, who introduced a
language in Title VI consistently had been interpreted to reach disparate
impact discrimination. In refusing expressly to limit § 504 to intentional
discrimination, Congress could be thought to have approved a disparate
impact standard for § 504. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S.
544, 554 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698-99
(1979).
"To be sure, well-catalogued instances of invidious discrimination
against the handicapped do exist. See, e. g., United States Commission
on Civil Rights: Accommodating The Spectrum of Individual Abilities,
Ch. 2 (1983); Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 410, 403, n. 2 (1984).
15
Although § 504 ultimately was passed as part of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, the nondiscrimination principle later codified in § 504 was initially
proposed as an amendment to Title VI. This proposal was first introduced
by Representative Yanik in the House. See H. R. 14033, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., 118 Cong. Rec. 9712 (1972); H. R. 12154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117
Cong. Rec. 45945 (1971). A companion measure was introduced in the
Senate by Senators Humphrey and Percy. See S. 3044; 118 Cong. Rec.
525-526 (1972). The principle underlying these bills was reshaped in the
next Congress and inserted as § 504 into major vocational rehabilitation
legislation then pending. Senator Humphrey and Representative Yanik
indicated that the intent of the original bill had been carried forward into
§ 504. See 119 Cong. Rec. 6145 (1973) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 118
Cong. Rec. 32310 (1972) (same); 119 Cong. Rec. 7114 (1973) (statement of
Rep. Yanik). Given the lack of debate devoted to § 504 in either the
House or Senate when the Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973, see R.
Cappalli, Federal Grants and Cooperative Agencies, § 20:03 (1982), the intent with which Congressman Yanik and Senator Humphrey crafted the
predecessor to § 504 is a primary signpost on the road toward interpreting
the legislative history of § 504 .

.
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companion measure in the Senate, asserted that "we can no
longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped in America
.... " 118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972). And Senator Cranston, the acting chairman of the subcommittee that drafted
§ 504, 16 described the Act as a response to "previous societal
neglect." 119 Cong. Rec. 5880, 5883 (1973). See also 118
Cong. Rec. 526 (1972) (statement of co-sponsor Sen. Percy)
(describing the legislation leading to the 1973 Act as a national committment to eliminate the "glaring neglect" of the
handicapped). 17 Federal agencies and commentators on the
plight of the handicapped similarly have found that discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of
apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus. 18
In addition, much of the· conduct that Congress sought to
alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if
not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe
only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent. For example, elimination of architechtural barriers was one of the central aims of the Act, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93-318, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1973), for as Senator Randolph pointed
out, "those things that a person without handicaps take[s] for
granted-stairs, escalators, narrow doorways-are often insurmountable obstacles to thousands of handicapped individuals." 119 Cong. Rec. 5885, 5886 (1973). Yet such barriers
were clearly not erected with the aim or intent of excluding
the handicapped. Similarly, Senator Williams, the chairman
of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee that reported out
§ 504, asserted that the handicapped were the victims of
"[d]iscrimination in access to public transportion" and "[d]is16118 Cong. Rec. 30680 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph describing
origins of § 504).
17 Senator Percy was both a co-sponsor of the predecessor to § 504 and of
the Senate version of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
18
See, e. g., United States Comm. on Civil Rights, Accommodating the
Spectrum of Individual Abilities at 17 (1983); Note, Accommodating the
Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N. Y. U. L. R. 881, 883 (1980).
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crimination because they do not have the simplest forms of
special services they need .... " 118 Cong. Rec. 3320
(1972). And Senator Humphrey, again in introducing the
proposal that later became § 504, listed, among the instances
of discrimination that the section would prohibit, the use of
"transportation and architectual barriers," the "discriminatory effect of job qualification ... procedures," and the denial of "special educational assistance" for handicapped children. 118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972). These statements
would ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify
the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect
as well as by design. 19 The most obvious evil Congress had
19
All the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have agreed
that, at least under some circumstances, § 504 reaches disparate-impact
discrimination.
See, e. g., New Mexico Ass'nfor Retarded Citizens v.
New Mexico, 678 F. 2d 847, 854 (CAlO 1982); Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado, 658 F. 2d 1372, 1384-1385 (CAlO 1981); Dopico v.
Goldschmidt, 687 F. 2d 644, 652-653 (CA2 1982); NAACP v. Wilmington
Medical Center, 657 F . 2d 1322, 1331 (CA3 1981) (en bane); Prewitt v.
United States Postal Service, 662 F. 2d 292, 305-307 (CA5 1981); Jones v.
Illinois Dept. of Rehabilitation Services, 689 F. 2d 724 (CA7 1982); Stutts
v. Freeman, 694 F. 2d 666 (CAll 1983); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F. 2d 1565, 1578-1580 (CA111983), vacated for further consideration in light of Smith v. Robinson, (104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984)),
104 S. Ct. 3581 (1984); see also Joyner by Lowry v. Dumpson, 712 F. 2d
770, 775-76, and n. 7 (CA2 1983) (rejecting use of "adverse impact" theory
as grounds for challenging state statute that requires parents who desire
special state-subsidized residential child care services for handicapped children to transfer temporary custody of their children to state, but reserving
question of whether that test might be used in employment discrimination
actions).
At least 24 federal agencies have reached the same conclusion. See 5
CFR 900. 704(b)(3) (OPM); 7 CFR 15b.4(b)(4)(DOA); 10 CFR 4.121(b)(4)
(NRC); 10 CFR 1040.63(b)(4) (DOE); 14 CFR 1251.103(b)(5) (NASA); 15
CFR 8b.4(b)(4) (DOC); 18 CFR 1307.4(b)(3) (TVA); 22 CFR 142.4(b)(4)
(DOS); 22 CFR 217.4(b)(4) (AID/IDCA); 28 CFR 41.51(b)(3), 42.503(b)(3)
(DOJ); 29 CFR 32.4(b)(4)(DOL); 31 CFR 51.52(b)(1)(vi), 51.55(b)(l) (viii)
(D. Treas. (ORS)); 32 CFR56.8(a)(6) (DOD); 34 CFR 104.4(b)(4) (D. Ed.);
38 CFR18.404(b)(4) (VA); 49 Fed. Reg. 1656 (1984) (to be condified at 40
CFR Pt. 7) (EPA); 41 CFR 101-8.303(d) (GSA); 43 CFR17.203(b)(4) (DOl);
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in mind when it enacted § 504 would thus seem to have been
the simple and benign neglect of the handicapped, 20 and we
therefore hesitate to conclude, with petitioner, that § 504
reaches only intentional discrimination.
At the same time, the position urged by respondents-that
we interpret § 504 to reach all action disparately affecting the
handicapped-is also troubling. Because the handicapped
typically are not similarly situated to the nonhandicapped, respondents' position would in essence require each recipient of
federal funds first to evaluate the effect on the handicapped
of every proposed action that might touch the interests of the
handicapped, and then to consider alternatives for achieving
the same objectives with less severe disadvantage to the
handicapped. The formalization and policing of this process
could lead to a wholly unwieldy adminstrative and adjudicaSee Note, Employment Discrimination
tive burden.
Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
997, 1008 (1984) (describing problems with pure disparate impact model in context of employment discrimination against
the handicapped). Just as there is reason to question
whether Congress intended § 504 to reach only intentional
discrimination, there is similarly reason to question whether
45 CFR 84.4(b)(4) (HHS); 45 CFR 605.4(b)(4) (NSF); 45 CFR 1151.17(c)
(NEA); 45 CFR 1170.12(c) (NEH); 45 CFR 1232.4(b)(3) (ACTION); 49
CFR 27. 7(b)(4) (DOT). We are unaware of any case challenging the facial
validity of these regulations.
00
Cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U. S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1976) ("[The] most obvious evil Congress had in
mind" when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the disparate treatment of minorities."). That disparate treatment was the most obvious evil
Congress had in mind in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not suggest that it was the only or even the most important evil Congress sought
to eradicate. See, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 432
(1971) ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability"); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 454 (1981).
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Congress intended § 504 to embrace all claims of disparateimpact discrimination.
Any interpretation of § 504 must therefore be responsive to
two powerful but countervailing considerations-the need to
give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep
§ 504 within manageable bounds. Given the legitimacy of
both of these goals and the tension between them, we decline
the parties' invitation to decide today that one of these goals
so overshadows the other as to eclipse it. While we reject
the boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings constitute prima facie cases under § 504, we assume without deciding that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped. On that
assumption, we must then determine whether the disparate
effect of which respondents complain is the sort of disparate
impact that federal law might recognize.

III
To determine which disparate impacts § 504 might make
actionable, both petitioner and the United States as amicus
curiae suggest that we focus on the nature of the action being
challenged. By relying on the nature of the action challenged and some concept of what constitutes disparate-impact discrimination, petitioner and the Solicitor General
argue that it is possible to define categories of disparate
impacts that the statute does, and does not, make actionable.
The standard offered by petitioner, for example, is that a
cognizable disparate impact occurs only when a grantee offers a service in a way that has the effect of excluding or otherwise denying the handicapped access to a service. 21 Yet
such a standard would seem to ignore the importance of assuring that the access provided be meaningful rather than
merely formal. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S.
424, 431 (1970).
21

Br. for Petr. 21.
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The Solicitor General, responding to the need to assure
that the Act's guarantees are not merely formal, offers a
more sophisticated elaboration on petitioner's skeletal standard. According to the Solicitor General, the touchstone
under § 504 should be the requirement that the handicapped
be provided with meaningful access to that benefit which the
grantee has chosen to provide. Under this standard, the
grantee has substantial freedom to define the benefit that it
is choosing to offer, but the grantee must then ensure that
the handicapped are in fact given meaningful and equal access to that benefit. At the same time, the Solicitor General
recognizes that the grantee cannot be given plenary power
over the definition of the benefit offered, lest a library without ramps be allowed to be treated as providing meaningful
access to a rampless library. To avoid this result, the Solicitor General adds a refinement to his basic standard by stating
that the benefit itself cannot be defined in a way that gerrymanders the handicapped out of the meaningful access to
which they are entitled. 22
22

The Solicitor General states that "Antidiscrimination legislation can
obviously be emptied of meaning if every discriminatory policy is 'collapsed' into one's definition of what is the relevant benefit." Brief for the
United States As Amicus Curiae at 29, n. 36. At oral argument, the government also acknowledged that "special measures for the handicapped, as
the Lau case shows, may sometimes be necessary ... ." Tr. of Oral Arg.
14-15 (referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974)).
The regulations implementing § 504 are consistent with the view that reasonable adjustments in the nature of the benefit offered must at times be
made. See, e. g., 45 CFR § 84.12(a) (1983) (requiring an employer to make
"reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations"
of a handicapped individual); 45 CFR § 84.22 and § 84.23 (1983) (requiring
that new buildings be readily accessible, building alterations be accessible
"to the maximum extent feasible ," and existing facilities eventually be operated so that a program or activity inside is, "when viewed in its entirety," readily accessible); 45 CFR § 84.44(a) (requiring certain modifications to the regular academic programs of secondary education institutions,
such as changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution of specific co~ses required for the comple-
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Applying this standard to the facts of this case, the Solicitor General notes first that, under Tennessee's new Medicaid
plan, the handicapped in Tennessee will be provided meaningful and equal access to the benefit of 14 days of covered
inpatient care. The Solicitor General then suggests that the
State of Tennessee, by defining the particular Medicaid benefit at issue as 14 days of inpatient coverage, has not gerrymandered the handicapped out of meaningful access to inpatient services; the handicapped, like the nonhandicapped,
may prefer more than 14 days of coverage, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that the handicapped cannot
make full and meaningful use of the 14 days of inpatient services for which they will be covered. Thus, according to the
Solicitor General's approach, respondents have failed to establish a prima facie violation of § 504.
There is much to commend in this approach. First, the
threshold requirement that the handicapped be provided
with meaningful access to the offerred benefit is consistent
with our approach to disparate-impact discrimination in other
contexts. For example, under Title VIIi.: the use of standards, tests or judgments that tend to exclude protected
groups disproportionate! constltu e Impermissible disparate-impact iscrimmatwn except when the use is justified by
business necessity. See, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975). Similarly, the Solicitor General's theory recognizes that, even when the handicapped are
allowed entrance into a program or access to a benefit, a discriminatory denial of meaningful access can result when reasonable adjustments to the program or benefit are not made
to accommodate the handicapped. Cf. Irving Independent
School District v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3377 (1984).
The Solicitor General's theory is also generally consistent
with Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S.
397 (1979), our major previous attempt to define the scope of
tion of degree requirments, and adaptation of the manner in which specific
courses are conducted).
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Davis involved a plaintiff with a major hearing disability who sought admission to a college to be trained as a
registered nurses, but who would not be capable of safely
performing as a registered nurse even with fulltime personal
superviSion. We stated that, under some circumstances, a
"refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory. Identification of those instances
where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination against the handicapped [is] an
important responsibility of HEW." 442 U. S., at 412-413.
We held that the college was not required to admit Davis because it app~ared unlikely that she could benefit from any
modifications that the relevant HEW regulations required,
id., at 409, and because the further modifications Davis
sought-full-time, personal supervision whenever she attended patients and elimination of all clinical courses-would
have compromised the essential nature of the college's nursing program, id., at 413-414. Such a "fundamental alteration in the nature of a program" was far more than the reasonable modifications the statute or regulations required.
Id., at 410.
Davis thus struck a balance between the statutory rights
of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs: while a grantee need not be required
to make "fundamental" or "substantial" modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required to make
"reasonable" ones. Compare 442 U. S., at 410 with id., at
§ 504. 23

23
Davis addressed that portion of § 504 which requires that a handicapped individual be "otherwise qualified" before the nondiscrimination
principle of§ 504 becomes relevant. However, the question of who is "otherwise qualified" and what actions constitute "discrimination" under the
Section would seem to be two sides of a single coin; the ultimate question is
the extent to which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications
in its programs for the needs of the handicapped.
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412-413. 24 This balance appears consonant with that struck
by the Solicitor General's requirements that grantees provide
meaningful access to their benefits and services and that the
benefit or service not be defined in a way that gerrymanders
the handicapped out of meaningful access.
To the extent we have difficulties with the Solicitor General's basic approach, they result principally from the vagueness with which the notion of gerrymandering is defined. At
points in its brief, the government appears to suggest that
the non-gerrymandering requirement precludes only the
most egregious refusals to modify the nature of the benefit
being offered-for example, an attempt to deprive hearing
impaired individuals of the right to become busdrivers with
the claim that the benefit offered is that of a job-withouthearing-aid. Cf. Strathie v. Department of Transportation,
716 F. 2d 227 (CA3 1983). Such a narrow concept of gerrymandering would seem to border on a requirement that proof
of intentional discrimination be shown. Cf. Gomillion v.
24

In Davis, we stated that § 504 does not impose an "affinnative-action
obligation on all recipients of federal funds." 442 U. S., at 411. Our use
of the term affinnative action in this context has been severely criticized
for failing to appreciate the difference between affinnative action and reasonable accommodation; the former is said to refer to a remedial policy for
the victims of past discrimination, while the latter relates to the elimination of existing obstacles against the handicapped. See Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N. Y.U. L. R. 881, 885-86 (1980); Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 171, 185-86 (1980); see also Dopico v.
Goldschmidt, 687 F. 2d 644, 652 (CA2 1982) ("Use of the phrase 'affinnative action' in this context is unfortunate, making it difficult to talk about
any kind of affinnative efforts without importing the special legal and social connotations of that term."). Regardless of the aptness of our choice
of words in Davis, it is clear from the context of Davis that the term affinnative action referred to those "changes," "adjustments," or "modifications"
to existing programs that >yould be "substantial," 442 U. S., at 410, 411,
n. 10, 413, or that would constitute "fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of a program .... " I d., at 410.
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Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). Yet at other points in its
brief, the government takes the position that reasonable accommodations in the nature of the benefit being offered may
at times be necessary to assure compliance with the Act. 25
This apparent ambiguity in the concept of gerrymandering
set forth by the Solicitor General need not be confronted in
this case. For even if we assume that the Act requires both
meaningful access and reasonable modifications in the nature
of the benefit offered, it does not follow that every claim of
disparate-impact discrimination states a prima facie violation
of § 504. First, judicial experienc~ ~th other areas of discrimination law sufficiently channe!;fhe inquiry into meaningful access to allow coherent limitations on this requirement to be set. Second, by reference to the Act itself, its
implementing regulations, and the nature of the changes
sought, it is possible to define outer boundaries on the
reasonableness of proposed modifications to the benefit being
offerred. As analysis of this case reveals, respondents' disparate-impact claim is sufficiently removed from established
patterns of discriminatory practices, and would require modifications far enough outside the boundaries of reasonableness, that the claim must fail. We therefore adopt for purposes of this decision the more expansive reading of the
Solicitor General's approach and analyze respondents' claim
on that basis.
IV
Respondents appear to proceed on either of two theories.
First, they seem to argue that 14 days of inpatient coverage
is not as effective for the handicapped as the nonhandicapped
because more of the handicapped than the nonhandicapped
will need coverage beyond 14 days. Second, respondents
suggest that any annual durational limitation on inpatient
coverage discriminates against the handicapped because (1)
the effect of the limitation will fall most heavily on them and
215

See supra, n. 22.
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(2) this harm could be avoided by the choice of other cost-savings plans that would not disproportionately disadvantage
the handicapped. Under either theory, respondents have
failed to establish a prima facie violation of federal law.
A

We begin by examining the nature of the practice challenged to determine whether it denies the handicapped meaningful access to the benefit being offered. This inquiry is
guided by our experience in other contexts with practices
that are neutral on their face but that have an unjustifiable
discriminatory effect on a protected class. As noted above,
the use of criteria, judgments, or standards that tend to disproportionately exclude members of such a group without
justification impermissibly denies meaningful access. See,
e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra; Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, supra. Meaningful access can also be denied
when a handicapped individual satisfies all threshold eli ·bility criteria but is · denied the opportunity to share in the
benefits of a grantee's program. Cf. Irving Independent
School Distsrict v. Tatro, supra. See generally J. Wegner,
The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal
Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 401,
459-498 (1984) (discussing exclusionary criteria and denials of
access in context of discrimination against handicapped).
The State's reduction in inpatient hospital coverage cannot
be assailed on either of these bases. In reducing state Medicaid coverage, Tennessee has not invoked criteria that have
a particular exclusionary effect on the handicapped; the reduction does not distinguish between those whose coverage
will be reduced and those whose coverage will not on the
basis of any test, judgment, or trait that the handicapped as a
class are less capable of meeting or less likely of having.
Moreover, it cannot be argued that "meaningful access" to
State Medicaid services will be denied by the 14-day limita-
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tion on inpatient coverage; nothing in the record suggests
that the handicapped in Tennessee will be unable to benefit
meaningfully from the coverage they will receive under the
14-day rule. 2a The reduction in inpatient coverage will leave
both handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users with
identical and effective hospital services fully available for
their use, with both classes of users subject to the same
durationallimitation.
That the practice challenged in this case neither relies on
exclusionary factors nor denies meaningful access to state
Medicaid significantly weakens respondents' claim. Respondents do not challenge a form of disparate-impact discrimination that we have refused to condone in other contexts. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972).
B
Because respondents challenge a practice that does not
deny them meaningful access to or exclude them from the
benefit being offered, we turn to the question whether Tennessee has failed to make reasonable modifications in its Medicaid services to accommodate the needs of the handicapped.
To define the outer boundaries of this requirement, we believe it is useful to look first to the substantive area in which
the disparate impact occurs. In enacting the Rehabilitation
Act and in subsequent amendments,'n Congress focused on
211
The record does not contain any suggestion that the illnesses uniquely
associated with the handicapped or occurring with greater frequency
among them cannot be effectively treated, at least in part, with fewer than
14 days coverage. In addition, the durationallimitation does not apply to
only particular handicapped conditions and takes effect regardless of the
particular cause of hospitalization.
27
The year after the Rehabilitation Act was passed, Congress returned
to it with important amendments that clarified the scope of § 504. See
Pub. L. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). While these amendments and their
history cannot substitute for a clear expression of legislative intent at the
time of enactment, Davis, 442 U. S., at 411, n. 11, as virtually contemporaneous and more specific elaborations of the general norm that Congress
had enacted into law the previous year, the amendments and their history
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several substantive areas in which it viewed the societal costs
of discrimination against the handicapped to be particularly
high. 28
One area to which § 504 is clearly and centrally directed is
that of employment. Indeed, we have held previously that
"the primary goal of the Act is to increase employment."
Consolidated Rail Corp v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1254, n.
13 (1984). 29 Given the vast amounts of money Congress invested in rehabilitation training in the 1973 Act and subsequent amendments, Congress was naturally concerned that
the rehabilitated be able to find jobs. 30 See generally 29
do shed significant light on the intent with which § 504 was enacted. See,
e. g., Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U. S. 657, 666-671 (1979); Seatrain
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 596 (1979). Congress
again amended Title V of the Rehabilitation Act in 1978, in the process incorporating the enforcement mechanisms available under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Pub. L. 95-602, § 505(a)(2), 29 U. S. C.
§ 794a 91982). We have previously relied on the post-1973 legislative actions to interpret § 504. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct.
1248, 1253-1254 (1984).
28
In addition to the moral entitlement of the handicapped to be integrated into society, see, e. g., 119 Cong. Rec. 5882-83 (1973) (statement of
Sen. Cranston), Congress was concerned with the social costs of various
disadvantages suffered by the handicapped. Congress recognized that accommodations costly in the short term were often in the long term costeffective. For example, rehabilitated persons were found to increase their
personal income greatly-in fiscal year 1976, the increase was estimated to
be over one billion dollars-and to pay at least 6% of this income in taxes to
federal, state, and local governments. H. R. Rep. No. 1149, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 9 (1978); see also S. Rep. No. 1135, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 12
(1972) (reaching same conclusion). In fact, "[c]onservative estimates of
the ratio of benefits to costs [of rehabilitation] have ranged between 8 to 1
and 35 to 1." H. R. Rep. No. 1149, supra, at 9.
'l!iJWe further said in that case, "[i]ndeed, enhancing employment of the
handicapped was so much the focus of the 1973 legislation that Congress
the next year felt it necessary to amend the statute to clarify whether § 504
was intended to prohibit other types of discrimination as well. See
§ 111(a), Pub. L. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (1974), amending 29 U. S. C.
§ 706(6); S. Rep. No. 93-1297, p. 37 (1974)." 104 S. Ct., at 1253-1254.
30
See, e. g., 119 Cong. Rec. 5882 (1973) (Sen. Cranston); id., at 24587
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U. S. C. § 701 (11) (1976 ed.).
Education was also at the core of the areas to which the
Act was directed. See, e. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 45,974 (1971)
(statement of Rep. Yanik); 118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Humphrey). Senator Cranston said,
"For those individuals who have handicapped children, the
expenditure of dollars for programs which meet their needs
and the needs of their children is a simple return on the equity from their taxes which has long since been warranted."
119 Cong. Rec. 5882-5883 (1973). See also 118 Cong. Rec.
3320-3322 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). The extent
to which the handicapped must be accommodated in public
education is now, of course, controlled in significant part by
the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1400 et
seq., 31 but where it is not, these statements indicate an explicit congressional concern with refusals to accommodate the
handicapped in the provision of educational services.
Finally, the gradual elimination of existing physical barriers to access and to transportation, and the construction of
barrier-free new facilities, were also among the central congressional objectives informing § 504. See 29 U. S. C.
§ 701(11) (1976 ed.) (authorizing agencies to "develop solutions to existing architectural and transportation barriers impeding handicapped individuals"); see also S. Rep. No.
93-318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1973). Indeed, the Senate
Report to 1974 Amendments to the Act listed architectural
barriers as among the forms of discrimination forbidden by
§ 504. S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974).
We do not, of course, intimate any view on specific questions
regarding the sorts of alterations in barriers to access that
might be required to accommodate the handicapped, com(Sen. Taft); S. Rep. No. 93-318, p. 4 (1973).
31
See, e. g., Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3474 (1984); Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984); Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U. S.
176 (1982).
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pare, e. g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F. 2d 644 (CA2 1982)
with American Public Transit Association v. Lewis, 655 F.
2d 1271 (CA DC 1981), but it is clear that Congress was very
much concerned with the problems posed by physical barriers
to access. 32
Neither of the theories upon which respondents rely places
the action challenged within one of these substantive spheres
with which Congress manifested particular concern. We
have no doubt that the Act aims at assuring that the handicapped be able to make effective use of those health services
that a recipient of federal funds provides. See 45 CFR
§ 84.52 (1983). But to accept what seems to be respondents'
first claim-that the handicapped, unlike the nonhandicapped, must be provided with more than 14 days of inpatient
coverage simply because the handicapped would disproportionately benefit from this extended coverage-we would
have to find that the Rehabilitation Act views certain illnesses, ie., those particularly affecting the handicapped, as
more important than others and more worthy of cure through
government subsidization. We find nothing to support the
ascription of such an intent to Congress. Cf. Doe v.
Coulotti, 592 F. 2d 704 (CA3 1979) (state may limit covered
private inpatient pyschiatric care to 60 days even though
state sets no limit on duration of coverage for physical illnesses). And to uphold respondents' second, and apparently
primary, theory-that State Medicaid programs must be designed to meet their funding limitations in the way that maximizes the provision of medical services to the handicappedwe would have to conclude that Congress desired to make
major inroads on the States' long-standing discretion to
choose the proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on services covered by State Medicaid, see Beal v. Doe,
32

Rehabilitation training, of course, was also central to the purposes of
the 1973 Act, and such training might involve issues concerning specific
health care benefits. In this case, however, respondents have never asserted that the 14-day rule has any effect at all on rehabilitation programs.
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432 U. S. 438, 444 (1977). Absent any indication that Congress even considered this basic alteration in the long-standing structure of another Federal program, we decline to read
the Rehabilitation Act itself as having such an effect. As a
result, neither of respondents' theories brings their case
within a substantive realm with regard to which Congress
expressly focused concern on the possible need for accommodations to the handicapped. This factor weakens the claim
that the failure to adjust the benefit being offered to something other than 14 days of inpatient coverage is unreasonable enough to state a prima facie case of disparate-impact
discrimination.

c

The extent to which agency regulations or other administrative actions suggest that a particular adjustment in the
benefit being offered is a reasonable accommodation may also
be an important factor in determining whether a prima facie
case of discrimination can be established. See Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York, 103
S. Ct. 3221 (1983); see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984) (holding that 1978 Amendments to the Act were intended to codify the regulations enforcing § 504); Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U. S., at 413 ("Identification of those instances where a
refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped person
continues to be an important responsibility of HEW"). 33
33
The original Act delegated broad authority to HEW to "conduct various studies and experiments to focus on long neglected problem areas."
29 U. S. C. § 701 (7) (1976 ed.). In addition, 1974 Amendments clarified
the scope of § 504 by making clear that those charged with administering
the Act had substantial leeway to explore areas in which discrimination
against the handicapped posed particularly significant problems and to devise regulations to prohibit such discrimination. See, e. g., S. Rep. No.
93-1297 at 40-41, 56 (1974); see also supra, n. 27. HEW's functions in this
area have now been assumed by its successor, the Department of Health
and Human Services, and by the Department of Justice.
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Respondents indeed place substantial reliance on the regulations implementing§ 504, particularly 45 CFR § 84.52(a)(3).
That regulation states that recipients of federal funds who
provide health services cannot "provide a qualified handicapped person with benefits or services that are not as effective (as defined in § 84.4(b)) as the benefits or services provided to others." Drawing on this provision, respondents
assert that their Medicaid coverage is less effective than that
provided to the nonhandicapped, apparently because the
handicapped have a greater need for more than 14 days of
coverage than the nonhandicapped. Respondents also point
to 45 CFR § ~4.4(b)(4), which prohibits utilization of
criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap, (ii) that have the
purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program with respect to the handicapped, (iii) that perpetuate the discrimination of another recipient if both recipients are subject to common administrative control or are
agencies of the same State.
From this provision respondents seem to conclude that the
failure to adopt a cost-savings plan less disproportionately
disadvantageous to them has the effect of substantially impairing Tennessee's presumed objective of providing adequate health care to the handicapped. 34
"'Respondents also rely on a variety of other regulations. See, e. g., 45
CFR § 84.52(a)(2) (stating that a recipient who provides health services
cannot "[a]fford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to receive
benefits or services that is not equal to that offered nonhandicapped persons"); 45 CFR § 84.4 (b)(l)(iii) (prohibiting a recipient of federal funds
from providing "a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or
service that is not as effective as that provided to others"); 45 CFR
§ 84.4(b)(l)(ii) (stating that a recipient cannot "[a]fford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others") .

..
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When viewed as a whole, however, the regulations do not
sufficiently support either of the conclusions respondents
would have us reach. First, 45 CFR § 84.4(b), referred to in
the regulations upon which respondents rely, makes clear
that:
"For purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services,
to be equally effective, are not required to produce the
identical result or level of achievement for handicapped
and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit or to reach the same level
of achievement . . . ."
45 CFR 84.4(b)(2).
Although this regulation indicates that adjustments to existing programs are contemplated, 35 it does not support the notion that the handicapped must get sufficient inpatient coverage beyond 14 days to assure that their illnessess are as
effectively treated as the illnesses of the nonhandicapped.
The regulation cannot plausibly be read to suggest that Tennessee is obligated to define the offered benefit, not as a
package of concrete health services, but rather as the amorphous objective of "adequate health care." 35 Read in conThe interpretive analysis accompanying these regulations states that
the term 'equally effective,' defined in paragraph (b)(2), is intended to encompass the concept of equivalent, as opposed to identical, services and to
acknowledge the fact that in order to meet the individual needs of handicapped persons to the same extent that the corresponding needs of nonhandicapped persons are met, adjustments to regular programs or the provision of different programs may sometimes be necessary."
45 CFR Pt. 84 App. A. 116 (1983).
36
The interpretive analysis to the regulations supports the conclusion
that the regulations do not require this change:
One common misconception about the regulation [45 CFR 84.52(a) (1983)]
is that it would require specialized hospitals and other health care providers to treat all handicapped persons. The regulation makes no such requirement. Thus, a burn treatment center need not provide other types
of medical treatment to handicapped persons unless it provides such medi36
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junction with each other, the regulations therefore do not
support a conclusion that the handicapped are entitled to any
different durationallimitation on inpatient coverage than the
nonhandicapped. 37
Respondents' alternative theory suffers from a similar defect. We decline to transform the general terms in which
the regulations are drafted into the specific requirement that
state Medicaid programs must always choose, from among
various otherwise legitimate benefit and service options, the
particular option most favorable to the handicapped. Although some coverage for inpatient hospital care must be
provided under the federal Medicaid program, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 1396a(a)(13) and 1396(a), the states generally retain broad
discretion to set reasonable limits on the package of amount,
scope, and duration limitations that make up the state Medicaid program. See generally Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 444
(1977). 38 In effect, then, respondents ask us to hold that the
cal services to nonhandicapped persons. It could not, however, refuse to
treat the burns of a deaf person because of his or her deafness.
45 CFR Pt. 84 App. A ~ 33 (1983); see also 45 CFR Pt. 84 App. A. ~ 37
(1983).
While these analyses might be read to suggest only that health care providers need not take steps that would compromise the essential nature of
their programs, we read them as establishing the more general proposition
that, while reasonable accommodations must sometimes be made, substantial subsidization of the particular medical needs of the handicapped is not
required.
37
Respondents do not seek to have the 20-day limitation reinstated; as
respondents admitted at oral argument, the 20-day rule is also disadvantageous to the handicapped in the sense that the handicapped, in greater percentage than the nonhandicapped, also need more than 20 days of inpatient
coverage a year. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. Indeed, the evidence at trial suggested that the 20-day rule had a greater disproporionate impact on the
handicapped than the 14-day rule would have. See Brief for United States
App. C, at lla.
88
Under the federal Medicaid regulations, a state plan must:
provide such safeguards as may be necessary to asssure that eligibility for
care and services under the plan will be determined, and such care and
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§ 504 regulations were designed to impose major constraints,
over and above those imposed by federal Medicaid requirements, on a state's choice of how to allocate funding among
the different components of the state Medicaid program.
Whatever the scope of HHS's authority to promulgate
regulations furthering the purposes of § 504, the language of
the regulations upon which respondents rely is far too broad
to permit the conclusion respondents seek. Before we would
find that these generally-worded regulations were intended
to limit a state's long-standing discretion to set reasonable
Medicaid coverage rules, that intent would have to be indicated with greater specificity in the regulations themselves,
or in interpretive analyses or agency policy statements. The
agency, however, has taken no authoritative position on the
question. 39 In the absence of such a position or some specific
indication that HHS believes that states must abandon reasonable durational limitations on inpatient days covered, we
decline to conclude that, in promulgating the § 504 regulations, the agency intended implicitly to make major alterations in state Medicaid choices that HEW itself had long approved. We therefore conclude that the § 504 regulations do
not require Tennessee to abandon its annual limitation on the
number of inpatient days covered under state Medicaid.

D

Finally, and for many of the reasons just canvassed, it is
clear that respondents' claims would require a remedy suffiservices will be provided in a manner consistent with ... the best interests
of the recipients.
42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(1982). Both lower courts found that 95% of all Medicaid recipients would have their hospitalization needs met under the 14day rule, and thus that the "best interests" standards had been met.
39
The Solictor General asserts that the regulations are not intended to
have such an effect.
Although respondents filed an administrative complaint with the HHS
Office of Civil Rights and sought a decision on whether the 14-day limita-
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ciently burdensome to the grantee as to constitute the "substantial" and fundamental" modifications that Davis held cannot be required of a federal grantee. 442 U. S., at 413.
Tennessee has made a policy choice to limit the rate of
growth of state Medicaid expenditures, and the administrators of the state Medicaid program have responded with a
judgment as to how to distribute the burdens resulting from
that legislative choice. To require that such broad-based
distributive decisions always be made in the way least disadvantageous to the handicapped would be to impose a virtually unworkable situation on state Medicaid administrators.
The administrative costs of that solution are beyond the reasonable accommodations Davis suggests might, under the
proper circumstances, be required.

v
Respondents' allegations of disparate-impact discrimination are sufficiently novel, sufficiently unaccounted for in the
statute and regulations, and would require a sufficiently burdensome remedy that respondents could not possibly establish that they have been denied meaningful access to Medicaid services in Tennessee or that Tennessee has refused to
make reasonable accommodations in the nature of the Medicaid services it provides. We intimate no view on whether
any one of these failings is necessary or sufficient to defeat a
disparate-impact claim, but their conjunction in this case
makes clear that respondents have not been unlawfully discriminated against. Assuming, then, that § 504 or its implementing regulations reach some claims of disparate-impact
discrimination against the handicapped, the disparate impact
of Tennessee's reduction in annual inpatient Medicaid coverage is not among them. For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents had established a
tion violated § 504 and its implementing regulations, that complaint still
has not been acted upon. J. A. 38-39.

83-727-0PINION
30

ALEXANDER u CHOATE

prima facie violation of§ 504. The judgment below is accordingly reversed.
It is so ordered.
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11/16/84

TO: Justice Powell
FROM: Lee
RE: No. 83-727, Alexander v. Choate, Justice Marshall's first
draft
There is obviously too much loose language in the
opinion.

Although I think that most of the dicta is harmless,

there are a couple of points worth mentioning:
(1) Justice Marshall states that he is assuming that §504 reaches
some conduct which has only a disparate impact.

~ the

Nevertheless,

opinion strongly implies that §504 is not limited to

~Ji ntentional

discrimination.

I do not find this troubling because

I think that §504 was intended to prohibit some unintentional
discrimination.

Congress was concerned about "benign neglect,"

as well as with intentional discrimination.

But if you feel that

§504 should be interpreted like Title VI, so as to prohibit only

~-----------~--------------------

intentional discrimination, you probably will find Justice
Marshall's extended discussion on this issue troubling.
(2) After deciding that the respondents had not been denied
meaningful access, Justice Marshall goes on to consider whether a
"reasonable accomodation" should have
handicapped.

bee~

made for the

I do not think that this second question should

have been reached.

If a handicapped person has meaningful access

to a federally-funded program, §504 does not require that any
"reasonable accomodation" be made.

It is in cases like

Southeastern Community College, where the handicapped person is

denied access to the program, that the "rea~onable ac~omodation"
\
'1
question is reached.
I think that Justice O'Connor is preparing a short
concurring opinion that will be circulated shortly.

I recommend

that you wait until that opinion is circulated before you join
the Marshall opinion.

.tJqtrtw Qlourt #f t4t ~ttittb .ttatt.S'
Jlulfhtgt#n. ~. Ql. 2.0~-'t~
CHAMBERS Of'

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

No. 83-727

Alexander v. Choate

Dear Thurgood,
I have read your thorough draft op1n1on in this case and,
although its scholarship is impressive, I am concerned that
because of its length and complexity it may not furnish the
helpful guidance~ agenc1es affected by §504 need for their
day to day operations. At present, I am disposed to circulate a
bri~r~~nce in the judgment that would attempt to
characterrze-what I believe to be the Court's essential holding.
Based on the discussion at Conference, I understood a
majority of the Court to believe that, without addressing whether
discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a violat1on of
S20j, tfie ~ype of afSparace ~ effect involved here does no~
constitute a pr1ma fa~ie case of crnlawful disciiminat1on.
Tennessee, consistent with state and f"ederal law conc'e rning
Medicaid, has chosen to provide 14 days of coverage for inpatient
hospital care. That decision is not alleged to reflect
discriminatory int~n~, antt""""ffie"S'ntefias not defined the benefit
in
way to exclude or deny access solely on the basis of a
person's handicapped condition. Instead, the State has provided
the same benefit -- 14 days of coverage -- to 60th handicapped
andl1onnandicapped persons. Section 504 does not require a state
to define benefits so as to guarantee equal results or
effectiveness for handicapped recipients. The fact that the
handicapped need or desire more of the benefit than the State has
chosen to provide does not in itself constitute discrimination in
( violation of the statute.

a

My concurrence will briefly elaborate on these views as
the grounds for reversing the Court of Appeals.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall

Copies to the Conference

Jlupunu Q14turl 4tf tlr~ ~nittb .-tat~•
..aar.Jrlqton. ~. Q1. 2Dp,.~
CHAMI!IERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 19, 1984

Re:

83-727 - Alexander v. Choate

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

I

L/

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

..

November 19 , 1984

83-727 Alexander v. Choate

Dear 'rhurgood:
I h.::tve concerns about your opi.nion. simi.l~r to
those expressed by Sandra in her letter of ~ovember 16.

There is a substantial amount of dicta that is
unnecessary to a decision of this case, and that may cause
trouble for us in subsequent cases . As t reao the opinion,
it strongly impl ie:-3 that. ~ 504 is not limited to intentional
oiscrimination. It can be arqued that ~504 should be interpreted like Title VI as applicable onlv to intentional dlscrimination. I am not certain how I woul~ eventually decide
this question, but do not Wftnt to commit unnecessarilY in
this case.
I also am troubled bv considerinq whether a "re~
sonable accommodation" should have been made for the han~i
capoed. My understanding is that if a handicapped person
has non-discriminatory access to a federally funded program,
§504 does not require that some ad~itional "reasonable accommodation" be made . In Southeastern Community College,
where the handicapoed person was denierl accPss to thP program, ¥Te reached the "reasonable accommodation" question .
Perhaps a second draft of your opinion will meet
concerns . For the present , I will await further
v1r it i ng.
thes~

Sincerely ,

Justice Powell
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

.jnpunu Qinttrlltf tlft ~tb .ibdts

._-u!pngton. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t~~
C HAM BER S OF

~~

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

··j
'

November 20, 1984

Re:

No. 83-727 Alexander v. Choate

Dear Thurgood:
I, too, have concerns about your draft opinion,
although they differ from those already expressed by Lewis
and Sandra.
I agree with most of your discussion of what is
required to make out a prima facie case under §504,
including your treatment of whether §504 reaches more than
intentional discrimination. Like Lewis, however, I read the
draft to imply that, even where meaningful access to the
government benefit is provided, §504 may nevertheless
require "reasonable accommodation" of benefits for the
handicapped above and beyond meaningful access. The first
sentence of Part IVB contains such an implication, and that
implication seems to carry through Parts !VB & IVC. I don't
think this question needs to be addressed, and whether or
not there may be situations where such accommodations are
required the question is best left for the future. I
believe that you can address respondent's argument that the
State must adopt plans with the least adverse effect on the
handicapped without implying that §504 may sometimes require
such accommodations.
Finally, I agree with Sandra's understanding of the
Conference discussion. For me, the State's decision here to
provide a benefit of 14 days of hospital coverage simply
does not result in a "discriminatory impact" as I understand
that concept. Only if the benefit provided were viewed as
"adequate health care" would it be possible to find such a
"discriminatory impact." But the State has not undertaken
through Medicaid to provide all its citizens with adequate
health care. In this case the State has defined the benefit
as 14 days of hospital coverage: this definition is

,..

•

.•

,.

- 2 reasonable and not designed to discriminate solely on the
basis of handicap. The draft opinion indicates th~t my
position is perhaps correct~ however, I would be h~ppier if
it were endorsed more clearly. Certain statements ' on page
29 imply that the State's decision resulted in a disparate
impact in this case.
If you could accommodate my views in a second draft, I
would hope to be able to join.
Sincerely,

· r~
~

Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference

I

CHAMI!II!:R8 01'"

..JUSTICE

w... ..J. 5RENNAN,

..JR.

November 23, 1984

.

No. 83-727
Alexander v. Choate

Dear Thurgood,
I agree.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

,.
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\

•
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.Snprtntt Qfllttrl llf tlrt ~b ,jtatts
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21lp~~ ,

CHAM8ERS OF"

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 83-727-Alexander v. Choate

As soon as possible,.! will circulate a completely
revised opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

Cf/tA .
•

T.M.

"•tmt

•tatt•

01~= #f flrt ~b
Jfu~ ~. ~· 20c?>l'

j

CHAMI!IER8 01'"

.JUSTICE

w .. . .J.

BRENNAN, .JR .

December 3, 1984

No. 83-727

Alexander v. Choate

Dear Thurgood,
I'm still with you.
Sincerely,

)

1/

!M

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

•r

•.
(

'•

jlnprtttU <lfattri cf tlyt 'Jttnittb ~taits

._aslp:ttgtcn:. ~. <If. 20,?~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 10, 1984

Re:

No. 83-727

Alexander v. Choate

Dear Thurgood,
Your revised draft in this case answers many of the
concerns I expressed in my previous memo, but I still have
one general and a few specific problems that I hope you
might be able to address.
The general problem involves your treatment of the
Davis case and the idea that "reasonable accommodation" of
benefits may be required by the Act. First, I note that
although on page 13 you assume arguendo that Davis may
require such accommodations, on page 20, the full paragraph,
your language is considerably more direct, and indicates
that Davis "requires" certain reasonable accommodations. I
do not th1nk that Davis "requires" any accommodations beyond
meaningful access, although it does indicate that some
· tinkering with a benefit may be necessary to fulfill the
Act's directive to provide meaningful access to an otherwise
qualified handicapped person. Since on page 19 you conclude
that the regulation at issue affords meaningful access, I
find the paragraph on page 20, and some subsequent
statements, very confusing, because they suggest that Davis
requires reasonable accommodation of benefits when
meaningful access is concededly afforded. As I said in my
previous memo, I believe this question can await another
day.
I am troubled by this paragraph for another reason.
The final sentence states that the "reasonable
accommodation" inquiry involves essentially a cost-benefit
analysis each time a particular accommodation is urged on
the courts. Sandra expresses problems, and I concur, with
having courts undertake such an analysis each time a
handicapped person argues that certain adjustments would
cost less than the benefit they would confer.

- 2 -

I do not believe we need to decide these questions in
this case; it would be sufficient to state that h~re
meaningful access to the relevant benefit is prov ~ ded, and
that whatever Davis or the Act may say about accommodations
necessary to prov1de meaningful access, or even about
accommodations beyond meaningful access, the Act simply does
not, as the draft points out, contemplate the complete
restructuring of a state benefit program that is urged by
respondent. I am afraid that any attempt to go further and
define when accommodations may be necessary causes problems
because it gets too far removed from the facts of this case.
Some specific requests in addition to the general:
(1) In accordance with the above, could you omit
footnote 22? As the footnote itself states, there is no
need to get into that probl~m here.

(2) On page 23, if the full paragraph above "Part IV"
remains as is, could you change "situation" in the second
sentence to "requirement"? I believe "requirement" more
appropriately states what the sentence is about.
(3) On page 6, the first full paragraph, second
sentence, you state that Guardians suggests "at a minimum"
that the regulations could make actionable the "disparate
impact" here. I am not sure what you mean by "at a
minimum," and I hope you could omit those three words.
I realize that these suggestions, if adopted, would
entail a major change in your discussion of the "reasonable
accommodation" requirement of the statute, and might even,
if acceptable to you, be unacceptable to one or more of
those who have "joined" you. I am therefore sending copies
of this letter to the conference: if you can see your way
clear to accommodate these suggestions, I will be happy to
"join."
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc:

•'

The Conference

. .tntt ClfO'nrl &tf tltt ~~ i'bdts

Jra,.lfinghnt. ~. Clf. 2ll~Jl.~

,.,ll

CHAMBER S OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

December 17,

Re:

1~84

83- 727 - Alexander v. Choate

Dear Thurgood,
I
favor

would
on

hope

Bill

that

you

will

Rehnquist's

December 10.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

look with

suggestion

of
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aid would pay hospitals on behalf of a Medicaid recipient.
Before the new measures took effect, respondents, Tennessee Medicaid recipients, brought a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief in which they alleged, inter alia,
that the proposed 14-day limitation on inpatient coverage
would have a discriminatory effect on the handicapped. 2
Statistical evidence, which petitioner does not dispute, indicated that in the 1979-1980 fiscal year, 27.4% of all handicapped users of hospital services who received Medicaid
required more than 14 days of care, while only 7.8% of nonhandicapped users required more than 14 days of inpatient
care.
Based on this evidence, respondents asserted that the reduction would violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U. S. C. § 794 (1982) and its implementing regulations.
Section 504 provides that:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall,
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ....

u. s. c. § 794 (1982).
Respondents' position was twofold. First, they argued
that the change from 20 to 14 days of coverage would have a
disproportionate affect on the handicapped and hence was

29

The State proposed an array of other changes in its Medicaid program.
Although respondents challenged many of these other changes, settlement
was reached on all the proposed changes other than the reduction in the
number of inpatient days covered. Thus none of the other changes is before this Court. Respondents also asserted a number of causes of action
other than their § 504 claim in their original and amended complaints.
These additional legal theories are similarly not before the Court.
Since the district court's decision, the state has amended its Medicaid
program in two minor ways not materially significant to the issues presented on certiorari.
2
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discriminatory. 3 The second, and major, thrust of respondents' attack was directed at the use of any annual limitation
on the number of inpatient days covered, for respondents acknowledged that, given the special needs of the handicapped
for medical care, any such limitation was likely to disadvantage the handicapped disproportionately. Respondents
noted, however, that federal law does not require states to
impose any annual durational limitation on inpatient coverage, and that the Medicaid programs of only ten states impose such restrictions. 4 Respondents therefore suggested
that Tennessee follow the lead of other states and do away
with any limitation on the number of annual inpatient days
covered. Instead, argued respondents, the State could limit
the L.umber of days of hospital coverage on a per-stay basis,
with the number of covered days to vary depending on the
recipient's illness (for example, fixing the number of days
covered for an app~ndectomy); the period to be covered for
each illness could then be set at a level that would keep Tennessee's Medicaid program as a whole within its budget. 5
The State's refusal to adopt this plan was said to result in the
imposition of gratuitous costs on the handicapped and thus to
constitute discrimination under §504.
3
The evidence indicated that, if 19 days of coverage were provided,
16.9% of the handicapped, as compared to 4.2% of the nonhandicapped,
would not have their needs for inpatient care met.
• As of 1980 the average ceiling in those states was 37.6 days. Six
states also limit the number of reimbursable days per admission, per spell
of illness, or per benefit period. See Brief for the United States App. B.
6
See Jennings v. Alexander, 518 F . Supp. 877, 883, n. 7 (MD Tenn.
1981). Respondents' diagnosis-related reimbursement proposal is. supported by a committee of the Tennessee legislature, which has recommended that the state adopt such a plan. The Medicaid System of the
Tennessee Department of Public Health , A Report of the Special Joint
Committee to the Ninety-Third General Assembly, 24, 26 (1983). The
Court of Appeals seems to have mischaracterized this proposal of respondents as an attempt to limit "the total number of visits per annum rather
than the number of days. " 715 F. 2d, at 1044.
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A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that respondents had indeed established a prima
facie case of a § 504 violation. The majority apparently concluded that any action by a federal grantee that disparately
affects the handicapped states a cause of action under § 504
and its implementing regulations. Because both the 14-day
rule and any annual limitation on inpatient coverage disparately affected the handicapped, the panel found that a prima
facie case had been made out, and the case was remanded 6 to
give Tennessee an opportunity for rebuttal. According to
the panel majority, the State on remand could either demonstrate the unavailability of alternative plans that would
achieve -the State's legitimate cost-saving goals with a less
disproportionate impact on the handicapped, or the State
could offer "a substantial justification for the adoption of the
plan with the greater discriminatory impact." Jennings v.
Alexander, 715 F. 2d 1036, 1046 (CA6 1983). We granted
certiorari to consider whether the type of impact at issue in
this case is cognizable under § 504 or its implementing regulations, and we now reverse.
II
The first question the parties urge on the Court is whether
proof of discriminatory animus is always required to establish
a violation of § 504 and its implementing regulations, or
whether federal law also reaches action by a recipient of federal funding that discriminates against the handicapped by
effect rather than by design. The State of Tennessee argues
that § 504 reaches only purposeful discrimination against the
handicapped. As support for this position, the State relies
heavily on our recent decision in Guardians Association v.
6

The District Court had dismissed respondents' complaint under Fed.
R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) on the basis, inter alia, that the effect on the handicapped of the plan that included the 14-day limitation was "not the type of
discrimination that§ 504 was intended to proscribe." Jennings v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 877, 881 (MD Tenn. 1981).
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Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 103 S. Ct.
3221 (1983).
In Guardians, we confronted the question whether Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, et
seq., (1982), which prohibits discrimination against racial and
ethnic minorities in programs receiving federal aid, reaches
both intentional and disparate-impact discrimination. 7 No
opinion commanded a majority in Guardians, and members
of the Court offered widely varying interpretations of Title
VI. Nonetheless, a two-pronged holding on the nature of
the discrimination proscribed by Title VI emerged in that
case. First, the Court held that Title VI itself directly
reached · only instances of intentional discrimination. 8 Second, the Court held that actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through
agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of
Title VI. 9 In essence, then, we held that Title VI had dele7 Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d,
provides:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. "
The premise of the State's reliance on Guardians is that § 504 was modelled in part on Title VI, and that the evolution of Title VI regulatory and
judicial law is therefore relevant to ascertaining the intended scope of
§ 504. We agree with this basic premise. See S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., 6390-91, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6373 ("Section 504 was patterned after and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U. S. C. 2000d-1 (relating to race, color, or national origin) and section 901
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U. S. C. 1683 (relating to sex)").
Nonetheless , as we point out infra, at-- and n. 13, too facile an assimilation of Title VI law to § 504 must be resisted.
8
103 S. Ct. at 3236-3237 (opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, in which THE
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined); id., at 3237 (opinion of
JusTICE O'CONNOR); id., at 3249 (opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, in which
JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN joined).
9
103 S. Ct., at 3232 (JUSTICE WHITE, announcing the judgment of the

. '·

~
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gated to the agencies in the first instance the complex determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities
constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were
readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices
of the federal grantees that had produced those impacts.
Guardians, therefore, does not support petitioner's blanket proposition that federal law proscribes only intentional
discrimination against the handicapped. Indeed, to the extent our holding in Guardians is relevant to the interpretation of § 504, Guardians suggests that the regulations im- [
plementing § 504, upon which respondents in part rely, could
make actionable the disparate impact challenged in this
case. 10 ·Moreover, there are reasons to pause before too
quickly extending even the first prong of Guardians to § 504.
Cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248
(1984) n. 13 (recognizing distinctions between Title VI and
§ 504). 11
Court); id., at 3244, n. 15 (opinion of JUSTICE MARSHALL); id., at 3249
(opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, in which JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN joined).
0
' See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). We conclude infra, at - - , that in this case the regulations do not
in fact support respondents' action.
11
In addition to the nature of the problems with which the § 504 Congress was concerned, see infra, at - - , at least two other considerations
counsel hesitation before reading Title VI and § 504 in pari materia with
respect to the effect/intent issue. First, for seven Justices, the outcome in
the first prong of Guardians was settled by their view that a majority of
the Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S.
265 (1978) had already concluded that Title VI reached only intentional discrimination. See 103 S. Ct., at 3236 (opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, in which
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined); id., at 3237 (opinion
of JUSTICE O'CONNOR); id. at 3253, and n. 12 (opinion of STEVENS, BRENNAN, and BLACKMUN, JJ., dissenting). Although two of the five Justices
who were said to have reached such a conclusion in Bakke wrote in Guardians to reject this interpretation of Bakke, see 103 S. Ct., at 3225-3226,
and n. 11 (WHITE, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); id., at
3240-3241 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), in the view of the seven Justices
Bakke controlled as a matter of stare decisis. Had these Justices not felt

J
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Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by
Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect. 12 Thus, Representative Vanik, introducing the
predecessor to § 504 in the House, 13 described the treatment
the force of this constraint, it is unclear whether they would have read an
intent requirement into Title VI. See id., at 3237 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Were we construing Title VI without the benefit of
any prior interpretation from this Court, one might well conclude that the
staute was designed to redress more than purposeful discrimination") (citation omitted). For that reason, the conclusion that, in response to factors
peculiar to Title VI, Bakke locked in a certain construction of Title VI
would not seem to have any obvious or direct applicability to § 504.
Second, by the time Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act in 1973,
nearly a decade of experience had been accumulated with the operation of
the nondiscrimination provisions of Titles VI and VII. By this time,
model Title VI enforcement regulations incorporating a disparate impact
standard had been drafted by a presidential task force and the Justice Department, and every Cabinet department and about forty federal agencies
had adopted standards in which Title VI was interpreted to bar programs
with a discriminatory impact. See Guardians, 103 S. Ct., at 3240-3241
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). These regulations provoked some controversy in Congress, and in 1966 the House of Representatives rejected a
proposed amendment that would have limited Title VI to only intentional
discrimination. Id., at 3241-3242. Thus, when Congress in 1973 adopted
virtually the same language for§ 504 that had been used in Title VI, Congress was well aware of the intent/impact issue and of the fact that similar
language in Title VI consistently had been interpreted to reach disparate
impact discrimination. In refusing expressly to limit § 504 to intentional
discrimination, Congress could be thought to have approved a disparate
impact standard for § 504. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S.
544, 554 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698-699
(1979).
12
To be sure, well-catalogued instances of invidious discrimination
against the handicapped do exist. See, e. g., United States Commission
on Civil Rights: Accommodating The Spectrum of Individual Abilities,
Ch. 2 (1983); Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 410, 403, n. 2 (1984).
13
Although § 504 ultimately was passed as part of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, the nondiscrimination principle later codified in § 504 was initially
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of the handicapped as one of the country's "shameful oversights," which caused the handicapped to live among society
"shunted aside, hidden, and 'ignored." 117 Cong. Rec. 45974
(1971). Similarly, Senator Humphrey, who introduced a
companion measure in the Senate, asserted that "we can no
longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped in America
.... " 118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972). And Senator Cranston, the acting chairman of the subcommittee that drafted
§ 504, 14 described the Act as a response to "previous societal
neglect." 119 Cong. Rec. 5880, 5883 (1973). See also 118
Cong. Rec. 526 (1972) (statement of co-sponsor Sen. Percy)
(describing the legislation leading to the 1973 Act as a national committment to eliminate the "glaring neglect" of the
handicapped). 15 Federal agencies and commentators on the
plight of the handicapped similarly have found that discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of
apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus. 16
proposed as an amendment to Title VI. This proposal was first introduced
by Representative Yanik in the House. See H. R. 14033, 92d Gong., 2d
Sess., 118 Gong. Rec. 9712 (1972); H. R. 12154, 92d Gong., 1st Sess., 117
Gong. Rec. 45945 (1971). A companion measure was introduced in the
Senate by Senators Humphrey and Percy. See S. 3044; 118 Gong. Rec.
525-526 (1972). The principle underlying these bills was reshaped in the
next Congress and inserted as § 504 into major vocational rehabilitation
legislation then pending. Senator Humphrey and Representative Yanik
indicated that the intent of the original bill had been carried forward into
§ 504. See 119 Gong. Rec. 6145 (1973) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 118
Gong. Rec. 32310 (1972) (same); 119 Gong. Rec. 7114 (1973) (statement of
Rep. Yanik). Given the lack of debate devoted to § 504 in either the
House or Senate when the Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973, see
R. Cappalli, Federal Grants and Cooperative Agencies, § 20:03 (1982), the
intent with which Congressman Yanik and Senator Humphrey crafted the
predecessor to § 504 is a primary signpost on the road toward interpreting
the legislative history of § 504.
14
118 Gong. Rec. 30680 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph describing
origins of § 504).
16
Senator Percy was both a co-sponsor of the predecessor to § 504 and of
the Senate version of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
6
' See, e. g., United States Comm. on Civil Rights, Accommodating the
Spectrum of Individual Abilities at 17 (1983); Note, Accommodating the
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In addition, much of the conduct that Congress sought to
alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if
not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe
only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent. For example, elimination of architectural barriers was one of the central aims of the Act, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93-318, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1973), yet such barriers were clearly not
erected with the aim or intent of excluding the handicapped.
Similarly, Senator Williams, the chairman of the Labor and
Public Welfare Committee that reported out § 504, asserted
that the handicapped were the victims of "[d]iscrimination in
access t9 public transportion" and "[d]iscrimination because
they do not have the simplest forms of special services they
need .... " 118 Cong. Rec. 3320 (1972). And Senator
Humphrey, again in introducing the proposal that }ater became § 504, listed, among the instances of discrimination that
the secti.on would pro~bit, the use of "transportation and
architectual barriers," the "discriminatory effect of job qualification ... procedures," and the denial of "special educational assistance" for handicapped children. 118 Cong. Rec.
525-526 (1972). These statements would ring hollow if the
resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting
from action that discriminated by effect as well as by design. 17
Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N. Y. U. L. R. 881, 883 (1980).
17
All the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have agreed
that, at least under some circumstances, § 504 reaches disparate-impact
discrimination. See, e. g. , New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v.
New Mexico, 678 F. 2d 847, 854 (CAlO 1982); Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado, 658 F. 2d 1372, 1384-1385 (CAlO 1981); Dopico v.
Goldschmidt, 687 F. 2d 644, 652-653 (CA2 1982); NAACP v. Wilmington
Medical Center, 657 F. 2d 1322, 1331 (CA3 1981) (en bane); Majors v.
Housing Authority of the County of DeKalb Georgia, 652 F. 2d 454,
457-458 (CA5 1981); Jones v. Illinois Dept. of Rehabilitation Services, 689
F . 2d 724 (CA71982); Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F. 2d 666 (CA111983); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F. 2d 1565, 1578-1580
(CAll 1983), vacated for further consideration in light of Smith v. Robinson, (104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984)), 104 S. Ct. 3581 (1984); see also Joyner by
Lowry v. Dumpson, 712 F . 2d 770, 775-76, and n. 7 (CA2 1983) (rejecting
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At the same time, the position urged by respondents-that
we interpret § 504 to reach all action disparately affecting the
handicapped-is also troubling. Because the handicapped
typically are not similarly situated to the nonhandicapped,
respondents' position would in essence require each recipient
of federal funds first to evaluate the effect on the handicapped of every proposed action that might touch the interests of the handicapped, and then to consider alternatives for
achieving the same objectives with less severe disadvantage
to the handicapped. The formalization and policing of this
process could lead to a wholly unwieldy adminstrative and
adjudicative burden. See Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 Harv.
L. Rev. 997, 1008 (1984) (describing problems with pure disparate impact model in context of employment discrimination
against the handicapped). Had Congress intended § 504 to
be a National Environmental Policy Act 18 for the handicapped, requiring the preparation of "Handicapped Impact
use of "adverse impact" theory as grounds for challenging state statute
that requires parents who desire special state-subsidized residential child
care services for handicapped children to transfer temporary custody of
their children to state, but reserving question of whether that test might
be used in employment discrimination actions).
At least 24 federal agencies have reached the same conclusion. See 5
CFR 900. 704(b)(3) (OPM); 7 CFR 15b.4(b)(4)(DOA); 10 CFR 4.121(b)(4)
(NRC); 10 CFR 1040.63(b)(4) (DOE); 14 CFR 1251.103(b)(5) (NASA); 15
CFR 8b.4(b)(4) (DOC); 18 CFR 1307.4(b)(3) (TVA); 22 CFR 142.4(b)(4)
(DOS); 22 CFR 217.4(b)(4) (AID/IDCA); 28 CFR 41.51(b)(3), 42.503(b)(3)
(DOJ); 29 CFR 32.4(b)(4)(DOL); 31 CFR 51.52(b)(l)(vi), 51.55(b)(l) (viii)
(D. Treas. (ORS)); 32 CFR56.8(a)(6) (DOD); 34 CFR 104.4(b)(4) (D. Ed.);
38 CFR18.404(b)(4) (VA); 49 Fed. Reg. 1656 (1984) (to be condified at 40
CFR Pt. 7) (EPA); 41 CFR 101-8.303(d) (GSA); 43 CFR17.203(b)(4) (DOl);
45 CFR 84.4(b)(4) (HHS); 45 CFR 605.4(b)(4) (NSF); 45 CFR 1151.17(c)
(NEA); 45 CFR 1170.12(c) (NEH); 45 CFR 1232.4(b)(3) (ACTION); 49
CFR 27. 7(b)(4) (DOT). We are unaware of any case challenging the facial
validity of these regulations.
18
u. s. c. - (1982).
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Statements" before any action was taken by a grantee that
affected the handicapped, we would expect some indication of
that purpose in the statute or its legislative history. Yet
there is nothing to suggest that such was Congress' purpose.
Thus, just as there is reason to question whether Congress
intended § 504 to reach only intentional discrimination, there
is similarly reason to question whether Congress intended
§ 504 to embrace all claims of disparate-impact discrimination.
Any interpretation of § 504 must therefore be responsive to
two powerful but countervailing considerations-the need to
give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep
§ 504 within manageable bounds. Given the legitimacy of
both of these goals and the tension between them, we decline
the parties' invitation to decide today that one of these goals
so overshadows the other as to eclipse it. While we ·reject
the boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings constitute prima facie cases under § 504, we assume without
deciding that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an
unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped. On
that assumption, we must then determine whether the disparate effect of which respondents complain is th~ sort of disparate impact that federal law might recognize.

III
To determine which disparate impacts § 504 might make
actionable, the proper starting point is Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397 (1979), our major previous attempt to define the scope of§ 504. 19 Davis involved a
plaintiff with a major hearing disability who sought admission
9
' Davis addressed that portion of § 504 which requires that a handicapped individual be "otherwise qualified" before the nondiscrimination
principle of§ 504 becomes relevant. However, the question of who is "otherwise qualified" and what actions constitute "discrimination" under the
Section would seem to be two sides of a single coin; the ultimate question is
the extent to which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications
in its programs for the needs of the handicapped.
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to a college to be trained as a registered nurse, but who
would not be capable of safely performing as a registered
nurse even with full time personal supervision. We stated
that, under some circumstances, a "refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory. Identification of those instances where a refusal to
accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination against the handicapped [is] an important responsibility of HEW." 442 U. 8., at 412-413. We held that the
college was not required to admit Davis because it appeared
unlikely that she could benefit from any modifications that
the relevant HEW regulations required, id., at 409, and
because the further modifications Davis sought-full-time,
personar supervision whenever she attended patients and
elimination of all clinical courses-would have compromised
the essential nature of the college's nursing program, id., at
413-414. Such a "fundamental alteration in the nature of a
program" was far more than the reasonable modifications the
statute or regulations required. I d., at 410. Davis thus
struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their
programs: while a grantee need not be required to make "fundamental" or "substantial" modifications to accommodate the
handicapped, it may be required to make "reasonable" ones.
Compare 442 U. S., at 410 with id., at 412-413. 20
In Davis, we stated that § 504 does not impose an "affirmative-action
obligation on all recipients of federal funds." 442 U. S., at 411. Our use
of the term affirmative action in this context has been severely criticized
for failing to appreciate the difference between affirmative action and reasonable accommodation; the former is said to refer to a remedial policy for
the victims of past discrimination, while the latter relates to the elimination of existing obstacles against the handicapped. See Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N. Y. U. L. R. 881, 885-86 (1980); Note,
Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 171, 185-86 (1980); see also Dopico v. Gold20

-

83-727-0PINION
ALEXANDER~

CHOATE

13

The balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise
qualified handicapped individual must be provided with
meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers.
The benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that
effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled; to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the
grantee's program or benefit may have to be made. 21 In this
case, respondents argue that the 14-day rule, or any annual
schmidt, 687 F. 2d 644, 652 (CA2 1982) ("Use of the phrase 'affinnative
action' in this context is unfortunate, making it difficult to talk about any
kind of affinnative efforts without importing the special legal and social
connotations of that term."). Regardless of the aptness of our choice of
words in Davis, it is clear from the context of Davis that the term affirmative action referred to those "changes," "adjustments," or "modifications"
to existing programs that would' be "substantial," 442 U. S., at 410, 411,
n. 10, 413, or that would constitute "fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of a program ... ,"id., at 410, rather than to those changes that would
be reasonable accommodations.
21
As the Solicitor General states, "Antidiscrimination legislation can obviously be emptied of meaning if every discriminatory policy is 'collapsed'
into one's definition of what is the relevant benefit." Brief for the United
States As Amicus Curiae. at 29, n. 36. At oral argument, the government
also acknowledged that "special measures for the handicapped, as the Lau
case shows, may sometimes be necessary ... .'' Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15
(referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974)).
The regulations implementing § 504 are consistent with the view that
reasonable adjustments in the nature of the benefit offered must at times \
be made to assure meaningful access. See, e. g., 45 CFR § 84.12(a) (1983)
(requiring an employer to make "reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations" of a handicapped individual); 45 CFR § 84.22
and § 84.23 (1983) (requiring that new buildings be readily accessible,
building alterations be accessible "to the maximum extent feasible," and
existing facilities eventually be operated so that a program or activity inside is, "when viewed in its entirety," readily accessible); 45 CFR § 84.44(a)
(requiring certain modifications to the regular academic programs of secondary education institutions, such as changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution of specific
courses required for the completion of degree requirments, and adaptation
of the manner in which specific courses are conducted).
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durational limitation, denies meaningful access to Medicaid
services in Tennessee. We examine each of these arguments
in turn.
A
The 14-day limitation will not deny respondents meaningful
access to Tennessee Medicaid services or exclude them from
those services. The new limitation does not invoke criteria
that have a particular exclusionary effect on the handicapped;
the reduction, neutral on its face, does not distinguish between those whose coverage will be reduced and those whose
coverage will not on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait
that the handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting or
less likely of having. Moreover, it cannot be argued that
"meaningful access" to State Medicaid services will be denied
by the 14-day limitation on inpatient coverage; nothing in the
record suggests that the handicapped in Tennessee will be
unable to benefit meaningfully from the coverage they will
receive under the 14-day rule. 22 The reduction in inpatient
coverage will leave both handicapped and nonhandicapped
Medicaid users with identical and effective hospital services
fully available for their use, with both classes of users subject
to the same durational limitation. The 14-day limitation,
therefore, does not exclude the handicapped from or deny
them the benefits of the 14 days of care the State has chosen
to provide. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972).
To the extent respondents further suggest that their
greater need for prolonged inpatient care means that, to provide meaningful access to Medicaid services, Tennessee must
single out the handicapped for more than 14 days of coverage,
the suggestion is simply unsound. At base, such a sugges22
The record does not contain any suggestion that the illnesses uniquely
associated with the handicapped or occurring with greater frequency
among them cannot be effectively treated, at least in part, with fewer than
14 days coverage. In addition, the durationallimitation does not apply to
only particular handicapped conditions and takes effect regardless of the
particular cause of hospitalization.

J
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tion must rest on the notion that the benefit provided
through state Medicaid programs is the amorphous objective
of "adequate health care." But Medicaid programs do not
guarantee that each recipient will receive that level of health
care precisely tailored to his or her particular needs. Instead, the benefit provided through Medicaid is a particular
package of health care services, such as 14 days of inpatient
coverage. That package of services has the general aim of
assuring that individuals will receive necessary medical care,
but the benefit provided remains the individual services offered-not "adequate health care."
The federal Medicaid Act makes this point clear. The Act
gives the states substantial discretion to choose the proper
mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on coverage,
as long as care and services are provided in "the best interests of the recipients." 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(19). The District Court found that the 14-day limitation would fully serve
95% of even handicapped individuals eligible for Tennessee
Medicaid, and both lower courts concluded that Tennessee's
proposed Medicaid plan would meet the "best interests"
standard. That unchallenged conclusion 23 indicates that
Tennessee is free, as a matter of the Medicaid Act, to choose
to define the benefit it will be providing as 14 days of inpatient coverage.
Section 504 does not require the State to alter this definition of the benefit being offered simply to meet the reality
that the handicapped have greater medical needs. To conclude otherwise would be to find that the Rehabilitation Act
requires States to view certain illnessess, i. e., those particularly affecting the handicapped, as more important than oth23

Because that conclusion is unchallenged, we express no opinion on
whether annual limits on hospital care are in fact consistent with the Medicaid Act. See, e. g., Charleston Memorial Hospital v. Conrad, 693 F. 2d
324, 329-330 (CA4 1982) (upholding 12 day a year limitation on inpatient
hospital coverage); Virginia Hospital Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781
(ED Va. 1977) (upholding 21-day limitation).
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ers and more worthy of cure through government subsidization. Nothing in the legislative history of the Act supports
such a conclusion. Cf. Doe v. Coulotti, 592 F. 2d 704 (CA3
1979) (state may limit covered private inpatient pyschiatric
care to 60 days even though state sets no limit on duration of
coverage for physical illnesses). Section 504 seeks to assure
evenhanded treatment and the opportunity for handicapped
individuals to participate in and benefit from programs receiving federal assistance. Davis, supra. The Act does
not, however; guarantee the handicapped equal results from
the provision of state Medicaid, even assuming some measure
of equality of health could be constructed. Ibid.
Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) pursuant to the Act further support
this conclusion. 24 These regulations state that recipients of
federal funds who provide health services cannot "provide a
qualified handicapped person with benefits or services that
are not as effective (as defined in § 84A(b)) as the benefits or
services provided to others." 45 CFR § 84.52(a)(3). The
regulations also prohibit a recipient of federal funding from
adopting "criteria or methods of administration that have the
purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program
u We have previously recognized these regulations as an important
source of guidance on the meaning of§ 504. See Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984) (holding that 1978 Amendments to the
Act were intended to codify the regulations enforcing § 504); Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S., at 413 ("Identification of those instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped person continues to be
an important responsibility of HEW"); see generally Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983).
1974 Amendments to the Act clarified the scope of§ 504 by making clear
that those charged with administering the Act had substantial leeway to
explore areas in which discrimination against the handicapped posed particularly significant problems and to devise regulations to prohibit such discrimination. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at 40-41, 56 (1974) .

.
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with respect to the handicapped." 45 C. F. R. § 84.4(b)(4)(ii)
(1983). 25

While these regulations, read in isolation, could be taken to
suggest that a State medicaid program must make the handicapped as healthy as the nonhandicapped, other regulations
reveal that HHS does not contemplate imposing such a requirement. 45 CFR § 84.4(b), referred to in the regulations
quoted above, makes clear that:
"For purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services,
to be equally effective, are not required to produce the
identical result or level of achievement for handicapped
and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit or to reach the same level
of achievement . . . ."
45 CFR 84.4(b)(2).
This regulation, while indicating that adjustments to existing programs are contemplated, 26 also makes clear that Tennessee is not required to assure that its handicapped MedicRespondents also rely on a variety of other regulations. See, e. g., 45
CFR § 84.52(a)(2) (stating that a recipient who provides health services
cannot "[a]fford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to receive
benefits or services that is not equal to that offered nonhandicapped persons"); 45 CFR § 84.4 (b)(1)(iii) (prohibiting a recipient of federal funds
from providing "a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or
service that is not as effective as that provided to others"); 45 CFR
§ 84.4(b)(1)(ii) (stating that a recipient cannot "[a]fford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others").
26
The interpretive analysis accompanying these regulations states:
"[T]he term 'equally effective,' defined in paragraph (b)(2), is intended to
encompass the concept of equivalent, as opposed to identical, services and
to acknowledge the fact that in order to meet the individual needs of handicapped persons to the same extent that the corresponding needs of nonhandicapped persons are met, adjustments to regular programs or the provision of different programs may sometimes be necessary."
45 CFR Pt. 84 App. A. ~ 6 (1983).
25
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aid users will be as healthy as its nonhandicapped users.
Thus, to the extent respondents are seeking a distinct
durational limitation for the handicapped, Tennessee is entitled to respond by asserting that the relevant benefit is 14
days of coverage. Because the handicapped have meaningful and equal access to that benefit, Tennessee is not obligated to reinstate its 20-day rule or to provide the handicapped with more than 14 days of inpatient coverage.
B
We turn next to respondents' alternative contention, a contention directed not at the 14-day rule itself but rather at
Tennessee's Medicaid plan as a whole. Respondents argue
that the ·inclusion of any annual durational limitation on inpatient coverage in a State Medicaid plan violates § 504. The
thrust of this challenge is that all annual durational limitations discriminate against the handicapped because (1) the
effect of such limitations falls most heavily on the handicapped and because (2) this harm could be avoided by the
choice of other Medicaid plans that would meet the State's
budgetary constraints without disproportionately disadvantaging the handicapped. Viewed in this light, Tennessee's current plan is said to inflict a gratuitous harm on the
handicapped that denies them meaningful access to medicaid
services.
Whatever the merits of this conception of meaningful access, it is clear that § 504 does not require the changes respondents seek. In enacting the Rehabilitation Act and in
subsequent amendments, 27 Congress did focus on several subt7 The year after the Rehabilitation Act was passed, Congress returned
to it with important amendments that clarified the scope of § 504. . See
Pub. L. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). While these amendments and their
history cannot substitute for a clear expression of legislative intent at the
time of enactment, Davis, 442 U. S., at 411, n. 11, as virtually contemporaneous and more specific elaborations of the general norm that Congress
had enacted into law the previous year, the amendments and their history
do shed significant light on the intent with which § 504 was enacted. See,
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stantive areas-employment, 28 education, 29 and the elimination of physical barriers to access 30-in which it considered
the societal and personal costs of refusals to provide mean- \
ingful access to the handicapped to be particularly high. 31
But nothing in the pre- or post-1973 legislative discussion of
§ 504 suggests that Congress desired to make major inroads
on the States' long-standing discretion to choose the proper
mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on services
covered by state Medicaid, see Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438,
444 (1977). And, more generally, we have already stated, \
supra, at - - , that § 504 does not impose a general NEPAlike requirement on federal grantees. 32
e. g., Andrus v. Shell Oil Co ., 446 U.S. 657, 666-671 (1979); Seatrain
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 596 (1979). Congress
again amended Title V of the Rehabilitation Act in 1978, in the process incorporating the enforcement mechanisms available under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Pub. L. 95-602, § 505(a)(2), 29 U. S. C.
§ 794a 91982). We have previously relied on the post-1973 legislative actions to interpret § 504. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct.
1248, 1253-1254 (1984).
28
"The primary goal of the Act is to increase employment." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1254, n. 13 (1984). See also
29 U. S. C. § 701 (11) (1976 ed.).
29
See, e. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 45,974 (1971) (statement of Rep. Yanik); 118
Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 119 Cong. Rec.
5882-5883 (1973) (statement of Sen. Cranston); 118 Cong. Rec. 3320- 3322
(1972) (statement of Sen. Williams).
30
See, e. g. , 29 U. S. C. § 701 (11) (1976 ed.); S. Rep. No. 93-318, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. , 4 (1973); S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong. , 2d Sess. 50 (1974).
31
Rehabilitation training, of course, was also central to the purposes of
the 1973 Act, and such training might involve issues concerning specific
health care benefits. In this case, however, respondents have never asserted that the 14-day rule has any effect at all on rehabilitation programs.
32
Assuming arguendo that agency regulations may impose such a requirement in specific areas to further the purposes of§ 504, see Guardians ,
supra; Lau v. N ichols , supra, the current regulations are drafted in far too
broad terms to permit the conclusion that state Medicaid programs must
always choose, from among various otherwise legitimate benefit and service options, the particular option most favorable , or least disadvantageous,
to the handicapped. Before we would find these that these generally-
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The costs of such a requirement would be far from minimal,
and thus Tennessee's refusal to pursue this course does not,
as respondents suggest, inflict a "gratuitous" harm on the
handicapped. On the contrary, to require that the sort of
broad-based distributive decision at issue in this case always
be made in the way most favorable, or least disadvantageous 1
to the handicapped, even when the same benefit is meaningfully and equally·offered to them, would be to impose a virtually unworkable requirement on State Medicaid administrators. Before taking any across-the-board action affecting
Medicaid recipients, an analysis of the effect of the proposed
change on the handicapped would have to be prepared. Presumably, that analysis would have to be further broken down
by class of handicap-the change at issue here, for example,
might be significantly less harmful to the blind, who use inpatient services only minimally, than to other sub-classes of
handicapped Medicaid recipients; the State would then have
to balance the harms and benefits to various groups to determine, on balance, the extent to which the action disparately
impacts the handicapped. In addition, respondents offer no
reason that similar treatment would not have to be accorded
other groups protected by statute or regulation from disparate-impact discrimination.
It should be obvious that administrative costs of implementing such a regime would be well beyond the accommodations that are required under Davis. As a result, Tennessee
need not redefine its Medicaid program to eliminate
durationallimitations on inpatient coverage, even if in doing
worded regulations were intended to limit a State's long-standing discretion to set otherwise reasonable Medicaid coverage rules, that intent would
have to be indicated with greater specificity in the regulations themselves
or through other agency action.
The Solicitor General agrees that the current regulations are not intended to impose a NEPA-like requirement on State Medicaid
Administrators.

I
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so the State could achieve its immediate fiscal objectives in a
way less harmful to the handicapped.
IV
The 14-day rule challenged in this case is neutral on its
face, is not alleged to rest on a discriminatory motive, and
does not deny the handicapped access to or exclude them
from the particular package of Medicaid services Tennessee
has chosen to provide. The State has made the same benefit-14 days of coverage-equally accessible to both handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, and the State is not
required to assure the handicapped "adequate health care" by
providing them with more coverage than the nonhandicapped. In addition, the State is not obligated to modify its
Medicaid program by abandoning reliance on annual durationa! limitations on inpatient coverage. Assuming, then, [
that § 504 or its implementing regulations reach some claims
of disparate-impact discrimination, the effect of Tennessee's
reduction in annual inpatient coverage is not among them.
For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondents had established a prima facie violation of § 504.
The judgment below is accordingly reversed.
It is so ordered.
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